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Introduction
Fingerprints have always been an identification mean due to their some impor-
tant properties: universality (everyone have one), permanence in the time (they
do not change when the time passes), individuality (there are no two identical fin-
gerprints). From the first forensic applications to the last biometric technology
applied to access control, fingerprints are considered as the sign of each human
being. The development of these biometric systems is driven by the intrinsic se-
curity of fingerprint (there is nothing to remember, like passwords or PINs, there
is nothing to carry, like a card). But in 2002 an important vulnerability has been
shown: it is possible to deceive fingerprint scanners through artificial replicas of
fingertips. Several studies, using different materials, have demonstrated that all
tested scanners (based on different physical principles) are not able to recognize
fake to live fingertips. Considering that biometry was born specifically for secure
applications, the risk of deceiving such systems by means of a synthetic clone of
fingerprint has caught the attention of many academic and commercial groups. In
order to address this shortcoming it is need to recognize a spoofing attempt with
artificial fingers looking for some life signs each time an user submit a fingerprint:
since the problem is to detect such signs, it is often referred as fingerprint vital-
ity detection problem. Although this research field is still in its infancy, several
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methods have been proposed so far, based on additional hardware to the exist-
ing capture device (detecting heartbeat, blood pressure etc.) and also on finger-
print image processing for extracting those life sign from the image captured by
the sensor. The first goal of this Ph.D. thesis has been to investigate the current
state-of-the-art in fingerprint vitality detection. Since the state-of-the-art is lack
of a systematic classification of all the current methods, we arranged the above
hardware-based and software-based approaches into a specific taxonomy on the
basis of the sensing methodology or the physical phenomenon which is consid-
ered as a life sign (elastic deformation, perspiration or morphology of the skin).
We also compared the performance of each fingerprint vitality detection approach
and coupled our experimentation with results reported in the reference papers. The
second contribution of this Ph.D. thesis is the development of two different new
approaches, which we indicated as power spectrum and ridge-width fingerprint
vitality detection. The former is based on 2D-Fourier Transform of the fingerprint
image aimed to detect vitality signs in the frequency domain (we have found that
high frequencies have a noteworthy importance in vitality detection). The latter is
based on some morphological considerations in the space domain (intra-distance
ridges and ridge width). Both approaches showed a promising performance, and,
in particular, power spectrum features outperformed state-of-the-art methods. Ex-
periments have been carried out on a dataset of images of live fingers and fake
stamps collected at the DIEE laboratory in Cagliari (82 live fingers and 72 fake
stamps, 20 acquisition for each finger/stamp). The dataset has been conceived
for satisfying the requirements of all vitality measures (different impressions for
static feature, different frames for dynamic ones). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the largest data set for fingerprint vitality detection, and it has been made
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publicly available into the research community, since, in our opinion, it can be
considered a significant benchmark for fingerprint vitality detection approaches.
Although vitality detection problem is far from its final solution, we believe this
Ph.D. thesis contributed to a first interpretation key of all the current methods
and to innovative proposals in fingerprint vitality detection. In the first chapter an
introduction of biometric technology is shown with a closer examination of finger-
print biometric systems, the second chapter reviews all the main threats of a real
systems from acquisition stage to storage data. Among all these vulnerabilities the
biometric spoofing attacks are dealt in the third chapter. Chapter four deals with
”liveness detection” methods from a review of the current methods to the newest
approaches, arranged in a clear taxonomy tree. Chapter five and six presents our
contribution in the field of liveness detection methods: from an experimentation
on the main software based solutions we show, in chapter five, the different accu-
racy properties of the previous methods. In particular we focus on the effect of the
fusion of complementary static and dynamic features. In the last chapter we give
the results of liveness detection based on two morphologic feature: one based on
ridge-width in the space domain, the other based on the study of high frequencies
in the Fourier domain.
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Chapter 1
Biometric systems
1.1 Identification and biometric data
At the end of the eighteenth century in the laboratory of the French police, Alphonse
Bertillon gave the basis to the new forensic anthropology. This new methodology
was based on some physical measures. Although the limited validity in the time of
this approach (at the begin of nineteenth this method was rejected from juridical
quarrel), we have to consider the effective importance of the idea. The essence of
this method was the complete correspondence between the collected data of the
anthroposomatic measures and the identity of a person. All the classified individu-
als are characterized completely only by some numbers referred to somatic marks,
until this time criminals could be identified only based on eyewitness unreliable
accounts. In 1882 Bertillon presented a criminal identification system known as
”anthropometry” and later also known as Bertillonage. In this system a person
was identified by a set of measurements of the head and the whole body. The
system was widely applied by French police and soon in other European coun-
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tries. This method was a fundamental step in forensic science because for the first
time the recognition of a person was based on a systematic approach. Although
this revolutionary aspect, the Bertillonage was affected by numerous vulnerabili-
ties: both the acquisition of the data (physical measures) and the matching process
were carried out by human hand, with its intrinsic error and its subjectivity. All
these limits caused in 1903 a relevant miscarriage of justice: in U.S. Penitentiary
at Leavenworth, Kansas, two identical twins were confused each other because of
their near anthropometric measures. This signed the end of Bertillonage and the
begin of new identification approach.
1.2 Automatic systems for human recognition
The modern biometry is the study of methods for uniquely recognizing humans
based upon one ore more intrinsic physical or behavioral traits. If we compare this
last sentence with the Bertillon’s method we can observe an evident resemblance.
A biometric system is an automatic recognition process from some physics data to
the identity of a person. Earlier this recognition process was assigned to the user
who submitting a password or a smart card to an access control systems obtained
the permission to enter in a secure place. The identity of a person was stored
in something to remember (a password) or in something to have (a smart card):
both this technologies have important limits (i.e. a password can be forgotten, or
a smart-card can be lost). With biometric technology an access control systems
recognizes automatically a person through his/her appearance or through some
particular physilogical/physics elements. With this new approach the identity of a
person is stored in the person.
2
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In biometric technology a first important distinction must be done basing on
the recognition modality:
- An identification process determines a person’s identity by performing matches
against multiple biometric templates. This type of systems is designed to
determine identity based solely on biometric information. An Identification
system answers the question ”Who am I ?”.
- A verification/authentication process is a one-to-one comparison in which
the biometric system attempts to verify an individual’s identity. In this case
the captured biometric is compared with a previously stored template start-
ing from a common user-id. The system receives as input both a biometric
and an identification data. The verification answers the question ”Is this the
person who he/she claims to be ?”.
Moreover, It is possible to distinguish wide range of biometric system tech-
nologies basing on the object of the measure: physiological systems are related to
the shape of the body or a part of it, or to some physics characteristics; behavioral
systems are related to the behavior of a person or to the way of doing something.
This is a brief overview of the main physiological data-based systems:
- Face: The face is the more common and more natural identification method.
The acquisition of a face is done by a digital camera that records the front
profile of the head of the user. At the moment these systems are affected
by lighting condition, facial expression, aging etc.. In order to overcome
this limit and improve the recognition accuracy new acquisition methodolo-
gies are developed: by the mean of a 3D scanner the whole face surface is
3
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recorded, this measure offers more defined information than bidimensional
acquisition of a camera and a complete invariance against light or context
conditions.[1]-[2]-[3]
- Infrared Thermograms: The use of a IR source for the acquisition of a
face or of an entire body can reveal something univocal traits of the person.
Another advantage of the use of IR light is the robustness to different illu-
mination conditions. In some systems the IR is employed to record the path
of the veins under the skin of a body.[4]-[5]
- Ear: The shape of an ear can be distinctive for the identification of a per-
son. By the extraction of some salient points from the ear-image and the
computation of the ”intra-distances”, it is possible to quantify the degree of
similarity among two ears.[6]-[7]
- Hand Geometry: Placing the hand on a flat scanner the system acquires
some geometrical information by the user. The importance of this technol-
ogy is the representation requirements: less than 10 bytes can be associated
to each hand. Due to its limited distinctiveness this biometric datum is used
only in some particular applications.[8]
- Retinal scan: In the last year in Holland a new national identification pro-
gram has began for the regularization of the immigration by the scanning of
the retinal vascularity of the eye. The image acquisition involves coopera-
tion of the user.[9]-[10]
- Iris: The iris is a muscle of the eye that regulates the quantity of the light
that reaches the retinal surface. The disposition of the fiber and its color
4
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Figure 1.1: Biometric systems
makes a uniquely pattern for each person. The iris recognition technology
is believed to be extremely accurate and fast.[11]
- Fingerprint: The oldest instrument for the forensic laboratory of identifi-
cation. The flow of the papillary ridge under fingertip surface is a unique
pattern for each person. Next section of this Ph.D. thesis is dedicated to this
biometric.[20]
Some behavioral data-based systems are:
- Gait: The particular way of walking of each person encloses a significant
biometrical trait. The speed, the length of a step, the movement of legs and
5
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other measures are the salient data for a recognition process.[12]-[13]
- Signature: The way a person signs his name is known to be a characteristics
of that individual. Signatures are behavioral biometrics that change over a
period of time and are influenced by physical and emotional conditions.[14]
- Keystrokes dynamics: The rhythm of each person of writing with a key-
board can represent each individual. This technique is non invasive and can
be monitored unobtrusively as a person is keying.[15]
1.3 Fingerprint and biometric systems
Among all the biometric systems, fingerprint-based identification is the most em-
ployed for commercial or forensic applications. The principal use of fingerprint
is in the forensic laboratory where this biometric is considered as an evidence el-
ement in a crime scene. A fingerprint is the ridge flow left after that a fingertip
touch a surface: the physiological wetness on the human skin is deposited on the
surface reproducing the conformation of the papillary ridge. Each person leaves
his/her own signature each time touches something, and this natural ”signature” is
used to find the identity. In the following, we retrace the history of this important
identification mean.
1.3.1 Fingerprint history
If we consider the use of fingerprint as an identification mean we can observe that
there is no clear date when fingerprinting was first used. [18].
Fingerprint traces go back to ancient age: picture writing of a hand with ridge pat-
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terns was discovered in Nova Scotia. In ancient Babylon, fingerprints were used
on clay tablets for business transactions. In ancient China, thumb prints were
found on clay seals. In 14th century, in Persia, several official government doc-
uments had fingerprints (impressions), and one government official observed that
all the fingerprints are different.
In 1823, John Evangelist Purkinje, a professor of anatomy at the University of
Breslau, published his thesis describing 9 fingerprint patterns. In this work there
was not mention to fingerprint as an identification mean.
During the 1870, Dr. Henry Faulds, a British surgeon in Tokyo, faced the study of
”skin-furrows” after noticing finger marks on specimens of ”prehistoric” pottery.
In 1880, Faulds gave an explanation of his classification system and a sample of
the forms he had designed for recording inked impressions.
Sir Francis Galton, a British anthropologist and cousin of Charles Darwin, began
his observations of fingerprints as a means of identification in the 1880’s. At the
end of nineteenth century Juan Vucetich, an Argentine Police Official, exploited
for the first time Galton pattern types in fingerprint classification.
In 1900 the United Kingdom Home Secretary Office conducted an inquiry into
”Identification of Criminals byMeasurement and Fingerprints.” Mr. Edward Richard
Henry (later Sir E.R. Henry) appeared before the inquiry committee to explain the
system published in his recent book ”Classification and Uses of Finger Prints.”
[16] The committee recommended adoption of fingerprinting as a replacement for
the relatively inaccurate Bertillon system of anthropometric measurement, which
only partially relied on fingerprints for identification. The Henry System of Clas-
sification was used by many european polices.
In 1905 U.S. Army begins using fingerprints. In 1918 Edmond Locard wrote that
7
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if in a fingerprint comparison there are at least 12 points (Galton’s Details) the
two patterns come from the same finger ( positive identification ).
By 1946, the FBI had processed 100 million fingerprint cards in manually main-
tained files; and by 1971, 200 million cards.
From 2000 the automatic identification assisted by computer is introduced in
many international polices; all US states and many european countries have their
own AFIS databases, each with a subset of fingerprint records.
1.3.2 Fingerprint and the identification process
From the first applications for a forensic use to the last automatic systems (AFIS)
the identification by fingerprints relies on pattern matching followed by the detec-
tion of certain ridge characteristics, also as known as Galton details or minutiae
and the comparison of the relative positions of these minutiae points with a refer-
ence (or template) print. First of all during the comparison process, the fingerprint
expert analyzes the whole pattern of the two fingerprints. In order to simplify this
identification step it is constituted a classification system based on general ridge
formations (i.e. the presence or the absence of circular pattern). The most famous
and used system is the Henry Classification System [16] (the name from the father
of the idea): both for the manual and the automatic identification process the clas-
sification of the general pattern is the starting point. In the Henry System there
are three different main classification groups: Arch, Loop and Whorl fingerprint
patterns.
Figure 1.2 shows the main four classification groups with some examples of
fingerprint images.
8
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ArchRight loop Tented arch Whorl 
Figure 1.2: The main four classification groups for fingerprint.
Figure 1.3: Representation of different minutiae points in a fingerprint pattern.
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Figure 1.3 shows different types of minutiae points. Identification points con-
sists of bifurcation, ending ridges dots and island and many other figures. These
figures are formed by particular conformation of the ridges. A single fingerprint
may have as many as 100 or more minutiae that can be used for identification
purposes. In forensic field the fingerprint experts compare the two fingerprints in
order to find a ”match”: the identification process consists in the analysis of all
the matching Galton details. Basing on the law system of each country there are
different regulations for the identification process. Generally we can distinguish
two different approaches: a qualitative approach in which the expert gives an iden-
tity when, basing on his own experience in the field, finds a resemblance from a
macroscopic to a microscopic view between the two fingerprints; a quantitative
approach in which the law regulations dictates the minimum number of corre-
sponding minutiae. In this last case the identity process ends when the counted
corresponding minutiae exceeds the legal limit (in table 1.1 number standards for
different country are presented).
1.3.3 Fingerprint in the automatic recognition systems
As we have seen before, fingerprints had a particular importance in a forensic
laboratory for legal purpose. From this beginning application a remarkable num-
ber of industrial companies have proposed biometric system based on fingerprint
data. First from academic groups and then from commercial purposes a lot of
secure applications have proposed. Fingerprint biometric systems have occupied
a wide range of applications both identification and verification types. There are a
lot of examples of real applications in which fingerprint recognition is integrated.
AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) is a system used for foren-
10
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Country Numeric Standard
Italy 16
Belgium 12
Austria 12
Cyprus 16
Denmark 10
France 12
Spain 10
Brazil 12
Colombia 10
South Africa 7
Table 1.1: Minimum number of correspondent minutiae for a legal identity
sic purpose, a fingerprint (generally found on a crime scene) is compared with a
database of known prints. Nowadays many nations in the world have their own
databases filled of millions of fingerprint. The large number of data recorded in
the police servers involves an enormous computational burden during matching
step. Therefore, AFIS systems are designed in order to optimize data storage and
speed automatic computation. In this last years also civil AFIS are presented in
the market of biometric system: for example the control for voter registration,
driver licensing and public assistance. Concerning authentication biometric sys-
tem, the typical use is access control. A system is integrated in the access of a real
or virtual area with the aim of control access: fingerprint authentication system is
integrated in some ATM (it is significant the South America market for fingerprint
biometrics used to identify ATM customers), in the entrance of military or public
11
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Biometric Identifier requirements Biometric system requirements
Universality, distinctiveness, Accuracy, availability,
permanence, collectability, circumvention comfort, costs, circumvention
Table 1.2: Biometric identifier and system performance evaluations.
places (In Orlando, Disney World scans fingerprints of park visitors) or simply
to authenticate in personal computer (from the first prototype by HP in 1998 to
the more recent computer with swipe fingerprint sensor between the touch-pad
buttons). Among the numerous type of biometric systems, fingerprint based ones
have reached an high diffusion in world market. As we can see from the previous
examples and from the market/economic implications (a detailed report is pre-
sented in figure 1.4) whilst a regular increase of biometric market is predicted for
this decade, the major share of biometric technology is occupied by fingerprint
systems.
1.4 Performance of a biometric system
In order to give an explanation of this large diffusion of fingerprint biometric
system it is obligatory to make a preliminary remark about the performance eval-
uation of a biometric system. A complete characterization of a biometric system
involves, first, a valuation of the biometric datum and then a valuation of the entire
system. In table 1.2 two lists referred to these two performance sets are presented.
A possible comparison of biometric identifier is reported in table 1.5.
A first consideration from this last table regards the fingerprint-based biomet-
ric systems: due to the well balanced evaluations of the esteem parameters this
12
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Figure 1.4: Composition of biometric market and revenues from 2007 to 2012
(From [17])
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Figure 1.5: Comparison of biometrics from [20]. H for High, M for Medium and
L for Low. The comparison evaluations are subjective perception of the authors.
type of biometrics has a wide diffusion among the others. Further, a fingerprint
biometric system responds to all the characteristics of a good automatic system.
Good accuracy (as testified by all the last International Fingerprint Verification
Competitions [19]), quite inexpensive ( with about 100 euros it is possible to buy
a fingerprint scanner with the matching software) and good public acceptability.
Another issue that can be drawn from these two tables 1.2-1.5 concerns circum-
vention parameter: the security threats involve both biometric identifiers (i.e. the
possibility to fake a biometric data) and systems (i.e. an intrusion attack against
the entire system). The fusion of the security level of the identifier and the systems
gives the global security of the entire biometric systems. This open the discussion
about biometric security that is presented in details in the next chapters.
14
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Security and biometry
2.1 A preliminary overview
Security is a focal point in biometric application. Actually such technology is
designed mainly to answer security and authentication tasks. This fact has given
an high push to academic and industrial research in the study of biometric secu-
rity. The concept of security for biometric systems has a wide range of meanings.
This chapter is devoted to draw an exhaustive overview about all concerns this
topic. Such technology interacts with ”personal” data which in some cases can
hold important information about an individual, its health or simply about his/her
presence in a place. For this reason ”privacy right” is joined to biometric systems
and in particular to the storage and treatment of biometric information. Then the
chapter shows the problem of circumventing and compromising such systems: all
the possible fallacies of a real system are proposed.
15
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2.2 Privacy and biometry
Privacy and biometry are always considered two connected arguments: first, be-
cause biometry treats about personal data, second, because biometry is related to
access control, and so, control the human free movements, then because the ac-
quisition of biometric data can be done in certain invasive modalities. In order to
evaluate potential privacy risk in biometric systems, it is necessary to consider not
only the biometric data but also the entire system. Therefore a lot of aspects that
must be considered for judging privacy invasiveness, can be summarized with the
following ”issues” :
- Are users aware of the system’s operation ?
- Is the system optional or mandatory ?
- Is the system used for identification or verification ?
- Is the system deployed for a fixed period of time ?
- Is the deployment public or private sector ?
- What is the context of the system ?
- Who owns the biometric information ?
- What type of biometric technology is being deployed ?
- Does the system utilize biometric templates, biometric images, or both ?
Are users aware of the system’s operation ? Deployments in which users are
aware that biometric data is being collected and used, and acquisition devices
16
CHAPTER 2
are visible, are less privacy-invasive than hidden deployments. User consent and
awareness are principle keys for privacy-right. Hidden biometric systems are par-
tially allowed only where a security risk is threatened (i.e. video-surveillance
control in airport gates or in other public buildings).
Is the system optional or mandatory ? A biometric system in which enrollment is
compulsory, such as a public sector program or one designed to control company’s
employees, shows a more direct relationship with privacy risks than an optional
system. Different protections for mandatory and optional systems should be de-
veloped.
Is the system used for identification or verification ? A system capable of per-
forming 1:N searches can be considered more susceptible to privacy-related abuse
than a 1:1 system. A one-to-multiple biometric system would be necessary for
use in any indiscriminate large-scale searches. Protections regarding 1:N usage
may need to be more strict than more employed in one-to-one usage also because
there is a major number of sensible informations. A typical applications of a 1:N
biometric system is AFIS for forensic purposes.
Is the system deployed for a fixed period of time ? In deployments where such
an option exists, the use of biometrics for an undefined duration has a negative
impact on privacy than one deployed for a fixed time. This applies in particular to
public surveillance deployments. When deployed for an indefinite duration, the
risk of privacy violation increases.
Is the deployment public or private sector ? Government collection of biometric
data without proper controls and restrictions is highly problematic. On the other
hand, private sector companies may be more tempted to share or link personal data
for marketing or profiling purposes. Suitable protections should be developed for
17
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each type of environment.
What is the context of the system ? There are a lot of different conditions in the
interaction between the system and the user. There are biometric controls that
guarantee user security (i.e customer in commercial trading), others that guaran-
tee the security of a population (i.e. the security control in a public place), others
are employed in forensic applications or for prisoner identity (control the iden-
tity of a person for the security of others). All these applications have different
conditions for storing data in a safety mode with or without explicit, informed
permission of the individual.
Who owns the biometric information ? Some biometric systems, especially in
authentication modality, offer the possibility to storing biometric data in a smart-
card in possess of the user. In this case there is no privacy violation because each
user has his own personal information. In some public sector uses it is not possi-
ble this: a central storage system that contains all the informations is connected
with peripheral biometric terminals. This situation where storage unit and authen-
tication one are physically separated has a different risk for the privacy violation.
What type of biometric technology is being deployed ? Behavioral biometrics are
much less likely to be deployed in a privacy-invasive fashion, as technologies such
as voice-scan and signature-scan can be easily changed by altering a signature or
using a new pass phrase. Behavioral biometrics are very rarely used in 1:N ap-
plications, which are less privacy-sympathetic than 1:1. Physiological biometrics
are much harder to mask or alter, and can be collected without user compliance.
Does the system utilize biometric templates, biometric images, or both ? Bio-
metric systems in which identifiable biometric images or samples are retained are
more likely to bear privacy risks than those which retain only templates. Biometric
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images are generally identifiable, and can be associated with a specific individual
based on visual inspection. Concerning fingerprint verification system, some re-
cent works try to demonstrate how it is possible to reconstruct of a fingerprint
image from some template minutiae point information.[25] As we can observe
from all these previous privacy conditions, it is necessary to protect both the data
from acquisition to the storage both the modality of acquisitions: the privacy right
regards also the relation between the user and the biometric system. In table 2.1
the major biometric technologies are reported with their correspondent privacy
risk.
In the last years the legal system of many countries in the world has put a
particular attention on the problem of the privacy. The need of this legal formal-
ization began from the conflict between privacy and security. In some countries
(such as France) privacy is a constitutional right explicitly referred, in other coun-
tries without constitutional privacy protections a series of juridical initiatives have
been proclaimed (i.e. in United Kingdom with the Data Protection Act 1998, in
Australia with the Privacy Act, 1988). In Italy, after the personal data protection
code in 2003 [22], it is noticeable to refer the recent attention of the ”Garante
della Privacy” concerning the protection of biometric data in forensic and security
application [23]. Currently, the Italian parliamentarian members are proposing an
initiative about the institution of a DNA database for secure purpose.
2.3 System vulnerability
In the previous section we have dealt with the problem of privacy right and bio-
metric data acquisition: we have seen the need of a protection of this personal data
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Technology Privacy Aspects Risk Ratings
Fingerprint Storage of images in public sector applications,
use in forensic applications, strong identification
capabilities
H
Face Easily captured without consent or knowledge,
large number of existing images can be used for
comparison
H
Iris Current technology requires high degree of user
cooperation, very strong identification capabil-
ities, development of technology may lead to
covert acquisition capability, most iris templates
can be compared against each other - no vendor
heterogeneity
H
Retina Requires high degree of user cooperation - image
cannot be captured without consent, very strong
identification capabilities
M
Voice Not capable of identification usage, Can be cap-
tured without consent or knowledge
M
Signature Signature images can be used to commit fraud L
Keystroke Can be captured without knowledge/consent L
Hand Physiological biometric, but not capable of iden-
tification, low cooperation of the user
L
Table 2.1: Principal biometric technologies and correspondent privacy aspects.
The risk rating is by an evaluation of IBG for Bioprivacy Initiative [21]
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during and after the acquisition process, in this section we cover all the intrinsic
vulnerabilities of a biometric system.
As the diffusion of biometric systems becomes wider, interest of the infor-
mation technology community is focusing on the methods of circumventing and
compromising biometric systems. This care for the protection of biometric data
comes from two evident points. First, the protection of biometric data means a
protection of the person: a wider use of biometric recognition, in particular for
forensic purposes, makes the biometric data very sensible with respect to privacy
rights. The greater difficulties of designing a biometric system like AFIS concern
security protection from external attacks. Secondly, biometric data are unchange-
able for a person: the gravity of a biometric datum theft consists in the fact that the
offended person ”lost” his/her identity forever. In order to face with this resound-
ing question, it is necessary : (i) to prevent the biometric datum theft, (ii) to design
secure biometric systems capable to detect a fraudulent attempt. Concerning item
(ii), in this section, we focus on the main biometric system weakness. In figure 2.1
the principal vulnerability points are shown for a biometric system from the ac-
quisition (at the scanner device) to data storage. In particular each arrow indicates
the position of the vulnerability with the corresponding description.
1. Denial of Service - This attack consists in the turning off the system or in
the hardware damaging. The use of adverse condition of employment in the
system can suspend the correct functionality. The aim of these threats is to
create a confusion and alarm situation.
2. False Enrollment - The user offers to the system a false identity. This is typ-
ical for passport frauds where by presenting a fake identity, the person can
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Figure 2.1: Biometric attacks and vulnerabilities.
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be false registered. With the possession of a wrong identity, it is impossible
to trace the cheat.
3. Fake Physical Biometric - The user submits a fake identity. This is the most
studied vulnerability because with simple methods it is possible to repro-
duce artificially a fake biometric datum (fingerprint, face, iris, voice...). In
this case the fake identity generally is a real identity of another person. In
addition to fake artificial reproduction there is the (not negligible) possibil-
ity of a physical coercion: ”Police in Malaysia are hunting for members of
a violet gang who chopped off a car owner’s finger to stole his vehicle pro-
tected by a fingerprint recognition system” (BBC News, 31 March 2005).
This item represents the plot along which this Ph.D thesis develops.
4. Fake Digital Biometric - The fake information is submitted into the system
directly in a digital type. This attempt requires a knowledge of the biometric
architecture and a direct access to the system.
5. Latent print reactivation - Fingerprint/Palm acquisition requires that the
user puts his finger on a surface and holds while the scanner records the
morphology of the fingertip surface. The contact between the skin and the
surface produces the transfer of a latent print from the sweat glands. The
latent print left on the surface can be reactivated (made visible) through a
range of techniques. When the biometric datum is visible can be recorded
again by the system (for fingerprint scanner generally placing a plastic bag
with water over the latent print).
6. Reuse of residuals - Some systems keep in a memory unit the last biometric
datum. Accessing to this unit makes possible to repeat the last authentica-
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tion procedure by submitting the last stored datum. Also this attack involves
a deep knowledge of the system architecture.
7. Replay Attack/false data inject - After the first acquisition of the biometric
device the information is passed to the next elaboration unit. This informa-
tion chain can be altered with the intake of an altered data. The encryption
by the input device of the information makes this attack more difficult.
8. Synthesized feature vector - This class of threats consists in the injection of
fake information after the feature extraction block. Most of the biometric
systems reduces all the biometric systems in a limited number of principal
features (minutiae point for fingerprint, geometric measure for hand geom-
etry and hear, a mono-dimensional signal for iris...). The attack inserts in
the system a set of this type of features.
9. Override feature extraction - A typical example is the tampering of the fea-
ture extractor block. This alteration can be software or hardware based.
10. System parameter override/modification - The percentage of False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR) and the corresponding False Rejection Rate (FRR) de-
termines the accuracy of a biometric system. In order to have an efficient
system the optimal condition is to have a trade off among these parameters.
The alteration of these values modifies both the accuracy and the security
of the system: an increase of the FAR involves the increase of the impostors
penetration rate.
11. Match override/false match - This is the tampering of the matching block
output. The result of matching operation between user input and template
information can be modified, overridden or ignored.
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12. Storage channel intercept and data inject - The access to the storage mean
involves a security and privacy violation. This threat consists or in the ac-
quisition of a template datum for a later use or in the injection of a false
template.
13. Unauthorized template modification - This attack hits the integrity of the
template data management. The corruption of template information (for
instance in the association between a user and his/her template) can subvert
the identification or authentication process. In this class of attacks is also
the physical corruption of template block included.
14. Template reconstruction - Generally the information in the storage unit is
constituted by the extracted features from the biometric datum. Although
this approach reduces the possibility of a fraudulent reuse of the encrypted
datum, recently, for fingerprint systems, the possibility of reconstruct a
complete fingerprint image only from the template minutiae points has been
showed by [25]- [27].
15. Decision Override/False accept - This is a form of modification of the de-
cision of the biometric system. In particular for authentication applications
the biometric system controls a door for the access in a secure space. In
this case the hacker tampers the control signal from the biometric system to
the entrance allowing the access. This threat can involve a modification of
physical connections.
16. Modify access rights - By obtaining system administrator privileges, a ma-
licious user can modify the access rights of the registered users or other
sensible operations of the entire system.
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This detailed classification of all the possible threats in a biometric system has
been compiled in the work [24]. The author distinguishes different vulnerabilities
considering the modality and the location (in the system) of the attack. It is notice-
able to consider how all these vulnerabilities have had an important contribution
for the development of new sensing technologies and new biometric architectures.
Next, three type of countermeasures are reported:
- Data protection: encryption of the data in the whole system, watermark-
ing (any modification of the image can be detected), steganography (hiding
template information in a cover image), application of a transformation to
the template (or ”cancelable biometrics”).
- Architectural solutions: multiple biometrics (different biometric data), multi-
modal biometrics (different features for one biometric), liveness detection.
- Sensing technologies: touch-less (for fingerprint a 3D model of the finger is
obtained), high resolution acquisition, multi-spectral.
It is important to remark that no systems can be completely secure and no sin-
gle defensive mechanism comprehensively can protect the system. A part from
this, the real esteem of the vulnerability of a biometric system involves also the
risk assessment. This is the background about biometric security in which this
thesis develops the ”fake fingerprint” question: the next chapter describes in de-
tails the biometric systems vulnerability concerning on fake fingerprints, next, the
thesis shows all the actual solutions developed in order to face this threat.
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Fingerprint reproduction
3.1 Fraudulent access
In the previous chapter all the threats for a biometric system have been presented:
from biometric acquisition spoofing to data storage tampering. In this chapter
we focus on the threat described at item 3 with the name of ”Fake Physical Bio-
metric”: the attempt of authentication in a biometric system by using an artificial
replica of the biometrics.
The following sections treat, after a previous overview of biometric trick ac-
cess, the problem of fingerprint spoofing since the first attempt to the current re-
search activity in the academic world. In the next chapter of this thesis the ques-
tion of security is faced concerning the main countermeasures against fingerprint
spoofing. Not only fingerprint but also a lot of biometric data can be spoofed. In
2002 Lisa Talheim in a magazine paper [37] suggested some test in order to fraud
biometric devices.
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Iris spoofing
The simplest spoofing method consists in getting a photo of the eye and reproduce
a printed copy of the iris. Another solution is submitting directly the image of an
iris by an LCD or a CRT monitor. One of the last attempt is the reproduction of
the iris pattern on a contact lens applied on the surface of an eye.
Figure 3.1: Example of hand geometry spoofing from [29].
Hand Geometry spoofing
Hand geometry recognition is based on some geometrical measures of the hand:
the scanner does not need to be presented with a 3D hand but only the side views
are captured. The scanner records the hand profile and from this it computes
the main measures. Features extracted from a presented hand shape are matched
against stored genuine templates for verification check. In the work of H. Chen
et al. [29] the authors have proposed two real implementations of making a fake
hand. Both methods are used to fraud a real system based on hand geometry
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recognition (HandKey II). The first method utilizes a fake hand made by plaster
powder. After the creation of a mould, the space of the hand is filled with a mixer
of plaster and water. The plaster hand is then used to spoof the hand geometry
system. The second method consists in the creation of a silhouette of the hand
from a captured images. This fake reproduction is made on a 2D paper card. It
is demonstrated that the system is insensitive to the changes in the thickness of
the hand. As showed in the paper the hand geometry recognition is a system
vulnerable to spoof attacks.
Face spoofing
Although numerous face recognition methods have been presented, the question of
spoofing face recognition systems is faced rarely. The most common faking way
is to use a facial photograph of a registered user [37] [30]. The easy availability of
humans face photos (download by internet, get a picture of a face with an hidden
camera...) gets the spoofing attacks more achievable.
Others biometric data can be more or less easily spoofed: system based on voice
recognition can be spoofed by a recorded voice, hand vein recognition systems
can be fooled with a picture reproduction of the pattern.
All these threats are studied by research groups with the intention to test the se-
curity of different biometric systems. Whilst new spoofing attacks are discovered,
corresponding new countermeasures are proposed in order to face these fallacies
of the systems. In the field of spoofing attack a particular attention must be payed
on fake fingerprint attacks. In the following section we redraw the history of fake
fingers since the first attempt to the newest fake fingerprint dataset of different
research groups.
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3.2 The reproducibility of the fingerprint
If we want to understand the high interest on fake finger reproduction we have
to consider the fundamental contribution of this type of biometric datum in the
identification history. Fingerprint is and has been the most important mean in
order to recognize unknown person, first for forensic purposes then in biometric
applications. This crucial position of fingerprint in the identification process has
increased the attention of deceitful intentions. In the next paragraphs we review all
the attempts for reproducing fingerprints from the first trials to the last scientific
works.
3.2.1 An overview of the artificial fingerprints
The first hints of fingerprint reproduction came from two different fictional works
between the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. In the novel
”The adventure of the Norwood Builder” by Sir. A.C. Doyle [31] there is the at-
tempt of forgery trials by the reproduction of a fingerprint made with a wax mould.
Although this reference is a fantasy work there is, for the first time, the idea of
fingerprint reproduction, the novel was presented on Strand Magazine in 1894.
Later another detective novel [32] related about the recovery of a fingerprint and
the doubts about its authenticity. Although the perception of copying fingerprints
was present in the fantasy of some writers none has still consider this question as
a real problem. The first recipe for fingerprint forgery came from Albert Wehde
[33]. In the Twenties he was a photographer and an engraver, he spent a lot of his
life to find a method to replicate a fingerprint: he left a fingerprint on a surface
and after applying white powder to enhance the latent print he photographed it.
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With the impression of the pattern he made a copper etching in order to create
a 3D pattern of the negative. This copper was used to forge latent prints. He
was the first man who proposed the copying of a fingerprint by photo-lithography.
These attempts were only trails with no statistical nor scientific fundamental. In
1998 Wills and Lee proposed on Network Computing [34] the first work with a
scientific value on spoofing biometric devices through fake fingers. The authors
tested the security of six devices submitting fake silicon fingers: four of these six
scanner were fooled by the attempts. Another method proposed by the authors
consists in the reproduction of fake fingerprint from latent print: they used dry
toner to enhance latent print, after the fingerprint was printed on a transparency.
The thickness of the ink created was used to make the 3D pattern. In 2000 T. Putte
and Keuning [35] demonstrated the possibility of easily fraud optical sensors with
mean of silicon replicas of fingers. The experiment was conducted with six de-
vices (optical and solid-state sensors), and all of them recognized fake fingers as
live ones. For the first time the authors proposed two different methodologies for
the creation of fake fingers, with and without cooperation of the user. Only in
2002 Matsumoto and others [36] undertook a milestone research in the field of
fake fingerprint. The group led by Tsutomu Matsumoto at the Yokoama National
University in Japan tested fingerprint system with silicone artificial finger. They
verified that capacitive and some type of optical scanner reject artificial fingers
because of the material chosen. In order to overcome this problem they made fake
fingerprints with gelatin: the composition of gelatine (collage and water) allowed
to obtain replicas similar to the human skin. This first experiment was conducted
only with five subjects. All the systems considered (eleven scanners) falsely ac-
cepted the artificial fingerprints. They considered four different experiments in
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which enrollment and verification steps were conducted with live and fake fin-
gerprints. In particular with enrolled live fingerprints they tested that the systems
accepted the artificial fingerprints more that 67 % of the time. In 2002 Liza Tal-
heim et al. [37] extended the security test on others type of biometric systems
(face and iris): they tried to spoof fingerprint scanner with alternative methods
(i.e. breathing on the surface of the scanner, putting a water bag or dusting with
powder to enhance the latent print). They used also silicone artificial fingerprints
where the molds were made by heating wax. Optical and thermal scanners were
fooled using this method. In 2002 [38] examined the security of a particular model
of scanner with different methods of frauds. The method that gave better results
was based on the use of gummy finger from a live finger mold (over 90 % of the
trials).
A similar test [39] on a different device (Precise Biometrics 100 SC Scanner)
was conducted in March 2003 by Ste´n, Kaseva and Virtanen. Best results were
obtained with gelatin fake fingerprints (they showed that simply breathing on the
scanner was not enough to fool the device). In August 2003 [40] two German
hackers claimed to have developed a method based on the reproduction of latent
print: Using graphite powder and tape to recover latent print, the fingerprint was
photographed and then the image used to photo-etch a copper plate. This etch is
then used as a mould for the silicone liquid. This was the first attempt for the
creation of an high quality fake fingerprint from a latent print. In the same year,
in October, Blomme´ et al. [41] proposed an evaluation of security of biomet-
ric devices against gelatine fingerprints. Once again the scanner were fooled by
artificial fingers (results varied between users and scanners technologies, the ac-
ceptance rate was 25-50 % of the trials). In 2002, while several research groups
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tested the security of biometric devices against fake fingerprint at the Biomedical
Signal Analysis Laboratory at West Virginia University, USA, S. A. C. Schuck-
ers with her group [42] developed new liveness detection algorithm based on the
concept of fingerprint image processing. With this work the question passed from
the study of the fallacy of biometric systems to the development of countermea-
sures against fake fingerprints. After that these works showed that it is possible
to deceive a biometric system with fake fingerprints, in recent years the attention
moved to the study of more efficient liveness detection methods. In the follow-
ing Section, we describe the main reproduction technologies followed by different
groups.
3.2.2 Reproduction technology
The reproduction technologies can be classified into two classes:
- with cooperation: (1) The user put his finger on a soft material (Play Doh,
dental impression material, plaster...) - Figure 3.2. (2) The negative im-
pression of the fingerprint is fixed on the surface - Figure 3.3. (3) A mould
is formed. Silicone liquid or another similar material (wax, gelatine...) is
poured in the mould. (4) When the liquid is hardened the stamp is formed -
Figure 3.4.
- without cooperation: (1) A latent print left by an unintentional user is en-
hanced by a powder applied with a brush - Figure 3.5. (2) The fingerprint is
photographed and then the image is printed in negative on a transparency -
Figure 3.6. (3) The paper is placed over a printed circuit board (PCB) and
then exposed to UV light - Figure 3.7. (4) When the photosensitive layer
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Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.3:
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Figure 3.4:
of the board is developed the surface is etched in an acid solution - Figure
3.8. (5) The thickness of pattern in the copper is the mould for the stamp -
Figure 3.9. (7) As for the cooperation method a liquid silicone (gelatine or
wax) is dripped on the board - Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.5:
Figure 3.6:
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Figure 3.7:
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Figure 3.8:
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Figure 3.9:
Figure 3.10:
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Methods for vitality detection
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have showed the possibility of deceiving fingerprint
capture devices by submitting a ”fake” fingerprint made up of gelatine or other
artificial materials. In particular we have seen the procedure for creating a replica
of a fingerprint from a live finger (consensual method) or from a latent print (non-
consensual method). In order to face with this threat, a biometric device must
”decide” if the finger on the acquisition sensors is alive or ”fake”. In other words,
the recognition process must be upgraded with an added function for detecting the
”vitality” of the submitted biometric: after that the user presents his fingerprint,
the system looks for some vitality hints and recognizes if it is ”fake” biometric.
This procedure is called ”vitality detection”. In scientific literature several meth-
ods to detect the fingerprint vitality (or ”liveness”) have been proposed, and this
research field is still very active. In the following sections we draw a survey of
the main liveness detection methods proposed in the literature. We distinguish all
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the methods, firstly, on the basis of liveness measures, then, on the basis of the
dataset employed and their performances giving a comprehensive comparison of
the results obtained.
4.2 The vitality detection in a biometric system
A possible taxonomy of fingerprint vitality detection methods is proposed in Fig-
ure 4.1 (for a reference correspondence see table 4.1). At first , existing ap-
proaches can be subdivided in ”hardware-based” and ”software-based”. The first
ones try to detect the vitality of the fingertip put on the sensor by additional hard-
ware able to measure physiological signs. These approaches are obviously expen-
sive as they require additional hardware and can be strongly invasive: for example,
measuring person’s blood pressure is invasive as it can be used for other reasons
that for simply detecting the vitality of his fingertip [52]. Moreover, in certain
cases a clever imitator can circumvent these vitality detection methods. There-
fore, making the image processing module more ”intelligent”, that is, making it
able to detect if a fake finger has been submitted is an interesting alternative to the
hardware-based approaches. Several approaches aimed to extract vitality features
from the fingerprint images directly have been recently proposed [53]-[59]. The
general rationale behind these approaches is that some peculiarities of ”live fin-
gerprints” cannot be hold in artificial reproductions, and they can be detected by a
more or less complex analysis of fingerprint images. The related vitality detection
approaches can be named ”software-based”.
According to the taxonomy of Figure 4.1, the initial subdivision of the software-
based approaches is based on the kind of features used. If the features extracted
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Figure 4.1: The proposed taxonomy of fingerprint vitality detection methods.
Liveness Detection Methods Reference Label
Dynamic- Perspiration based [53],[56],[58]
Dynamic- Elastic deformation based [57]
Static- Single impression - Perspiration based [53],[59]
Static- Single impression - Morphology based [55]
Static- Multiple impression - Elastic deformation based [54],[58]
Static- Multiple impression - Morphology based [58]
Table 4.1: Fingerprint vitality detection and corresponding references.
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derive from the analysis of multiple frames of the same fingerprint, captured while
the subject puts his fingertip on the acquisition surface at certain time periods
(e.g., at 0 sec and at 5 sec), the related methods are named ”dynamic” (as they
use dynamic features) . On the other hand, if features are extracted from a single
fingerprint impression or the comparison of different impressions, the methods
are named ”static” (as they use static features). Referring to the leaves of the tax-
onomy in Figure 4.1, they describe software-based approaches as functions of the
physical principle they exploit: the perspiration, the elastic distortion phenomena,
and the intrinsic structure of fingerprints (morphological approaches). Accord-
ing to the proposed taxonomy, in the following sections, we review the vitality
detection methods proposed in the scientific literature.
4.3 Hardware solutions
This classification includes all the additional devices integrated in biometric sys-
tems in which the liveness detection is carried out by an hardware device. Gen-
erally all these methods concern analysis on the fingertip: the device looks for
specific physiological signs in the fingertip . A lot of US patent have been filed
concerning liveness detection. Some functional principles that guarantees a live-
ness detection are reviewed in the following:
Optical property - A method proposed in 2005 by a biometric factory ex-
ploits a multispectral analysis of the fingertip skin: living human skin has
certain unique optical characteristics due to its chemical and physiological
composition which affects optical absorbance properties. The light source
in the scanner is formed by LEDs of various wavelength. By collecting im-
43
CHAPTER 4
ages generated from different illumination wavelengths passed into the skin,
different tissue layer features may be measured and used to ensure that the
material is living human skin.[45]
Pulse - A possible way for liveness detection is the analysis of the presence
of pulse in the fingertip. This methods can be fooled by using a thin stamp
applied under the fingertip. Another drawback of the measure is the long
time for the acquisition (considering a mean pulse frequency of about 60
beats per minute, the user must hold the fingertip on the scanner for about
five seconds). [46]
Pressure - A possible alternative for the previous methods consists in the
blood pressure measure. [44]
Electrical Impedance - The electric impedance of human skin can range
from kilo-Ohms to mega-Ohms depending on the wetness of the finger.
Measuring these electrical properties of the fingertip surface, a fraudulent
attack with an artificial finger can be detected. Also this technique can be
fooled by wetting the artificial finger or using different materials of the re-
production (i.e. gelatine). [51]
Odor - A recent analysis of the odor has been proposed to liveness detec-
tion: an electrical nose is applied in the biometric device with the aim of
recognize the typical material used to create fake fingers.[47]
Currently new technologies have been developed for liveness detection. The bio-
metric system exploits some advanced acquisition devices in order to block fake
replicas. Among these we can consider ”touchless sensor technology” [48]-[49]:
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whole the surface of the fingertip is acquired by a 3D scanner. With such acquisi-
tion it is possible to detect an alteration of the anatomy of the fingertip. Another
innovative solution concerns ”high resolution sensor technology” [50]. The device
is upgraded with an high definition sensor: at high resolution it is possible to eval-
uate the conformation of sub-microscopic characteristics of the skin (poroscopy
analysis). The absence of these particularity of the skin can be a valid help for
recognizing artificial replicas.
Figure 4.2: Examples of touchless fingerprint scanner.
Moreover, there is a class of new approaches which has not a well defined
position in the considered taxonomy: in the beginning multimodal and multi-
biometric acquisitions have been presented by scientific literature as new methods
to improve recognition process and reduce recognition error (false acceptances or
rejections). Submitting more than one biometric (i.e. fingerprint and face, or voice
and face) can reduce false acceptance/rejection error rate and recognizing the user
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can be easier than using mono-modal systems. Instead, the word ”multimodal”
means that the user submits more times the same biometric (i.e. a fingerprint),
and the system exploits different characteristics of this in order to univocally as-
sign the identity. Currently these two different approaches are presented as pos-
sible vitality detection methods. Their classification is not easy: on one hand,
these require additional hardware for the acquisition step, on the other hand, the
measures fusion is based on software based algorithms.
4.4 Software solutions
4.4.1 Static systems: single impression algorithms
By following the path of the tree in Figure 4.1 from the static methods-junction,
we first consider methods which exploit single impression. These can be clas-
sified into two further classes: perspiration and morphology based. About the
former we have selected two main works as [59] and [53]. Both study the perspi-
ration phenomenon with two transforms. In particular, Ref. [59] adopted wavelet
space measure, Ref. [53] Fourier space measure.
Tan and Schuckers [59] showed how it is possible to clearly distinguish a live from
a fake finger by wavelet transform. The rationale of this method is the analysis of
the particular shape of the finger surface. In live fingers, in order to guarantee the
physiological thermo-regulation, there are many little chinks named ”pores” scat-
tered along the center of the ridges. Because of this characteristic the acquired im-
age of a finger shows a non-regular shape of the ridges. Generally the path of the
ridges is irregular and, if the resolution of the device is high enough, it is possible
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to observe these pseudo-periodic conformations at the center of the ridges. With
the fabrication step of an artificial finger it is possible to lose these micro-details
and consequently the correspondent acquired image is more regular in the ridge
shape. The authors propose to analyze this feature with a wavelet decomposition.
In particular, the image is enhanced and converted into a mono-dimensional signal
as the gray level profile extracted in correspondence of the center of the ridges. A
wavelet decomposition of this signal is applied with a five-levels multiresolution
scheme: The standard deviation, the mean value for each wavelet coefficient and
from the original and the last approximation signals are computed. The obtained
14 parameters are considered as a feature-vector for the next classification stage.
The concept of detecting liveness from the skin perspiration analysis of the pores
has been already proposed in [53]. In particular, the authors uses one static fea-
ture, named SM , based on the Fast Fourier Transform of the fingerprint skeleton
converted into a mono-dimensional signal. The rationale is that for a live finger it
is possible to notice clearly the regular periodicity due to the pores on the ridges.
On the contrary this regularity is not evident for spoof fingerprint signals. Another
work is noticeable to mention. Unlike the previous works, this applies a liveness
detection by studying the morphology of the fingerprint images. Thus, by refer-
ring to Figure 4.1, the branch ending to morphologic based method is related to
the work by Moon et al. [55]. The study is based on a different method with a
contrasting argument. Looking at the finger surface with an high resolution Dig-
ital Single Lens Reflex camera, they observe that the surface of a fake finger is
much coarser then that of a live finger. The main characteristic of this work is that
an high resolution sensor is necessary for successfully capturing this difference
(1000 dpi, whilst current sensors exhibit 500 dpi on average). Moreover, this ap-
47
CHAPTER 4
proach does not work with the entire image, too large because of its resolution, but
with subsamples of a fixed size. For extracting this feature, the residual noise re-
turned from a denoising-process applied to the original sub-images is considered.
The standard deviation of this noise is then computed to highlight the difference
between live and fake coarseness.
4.4.2 Static systems: multiple impression algorithms
Whilst the previous studies search a liveness indication from intrinsic properties
of a single impression, there are other static features based on multiple impres-
sions: in this case the liveness is derived from a comparison between a reference
template image and the input image. While liveness signs are intrinsic properties
of one fingerprint image (presence or absence of pores, residual noise) for the
first, liveness detection is guaranteed by a comparison between one ”live” tem-
plate with an unknown (live or fake ?) client for these new solutions. These
methods are represented in Figure 4.1 with two branches starting from the ”Multi-
impressions” node: one indicates methods based on elastic-deformation features,
the other indicates morphologic features-based approaches.
Ref [54] falls within the first category. Given a genuine query-template pair of fin-
gerprints, the entity of elastic distortion between the two sets of extracted minutiae
is measured by a thin-plate spline model. The idea is that live and spoof finger-
prints show different elasticity response repeating the acquisitions.
The experimental investigation in [58] considers both the elastic-deformation based
method and the morphology-based one. The elastic deformation is evaluated by
computing the averaged sum of all the distances among the matched minutiae of
input and template fingerprints. The different elastic response of a live finger or
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an artificial stamp is linked with the spread of this mean value.
The other static multi-impression measure is based on morphologic investigation.
The feature that exploits ridge width (Ref. [58]) is based on the idea that dur-
ing the creation of fingerprint replica, there is an unavoidable modification of the
thickness of the ridges: first when the user put his finger on the cast material, next
when the stamp is created with liquid silicone.
As we can observe all these measures (elasticity, morphological features) are user-
dependent, and for this, it is need a multi-impression analysis.
4.4.3 Dynamic systems
Dynamic methods for vitality detection relies on the analysis of different image
frames acquired during an interval while the user put his finger on the scanner. As
shown in Figure 4.1, existing dynamic methods can be based on the perspiration
phenomenon or on the elastic response of the skin.
While in [53] the periodicity of pores along the ridges is employed through a
static measure to detect liveness of a fingerprint, in the same work the presence of
pores is exploited by considering their physiologic property: the pores scattered
on the fingertip surface are the source of the perspiration process. When the fin-
ger is in contact with the surface of the scanner, the skin gets wetter because of
an increase of sweat amount. This physiological phenomenon can be recorded by
acquiring sequential frames during a fixed interval of few seconds. The variation
of the wetness of the fingertip skin reflects on a variation of the gray-level profile
of the acquired images. In order to evaluate this feature, the fingerprint skeleton
of the image at 0 and 5 seconds is converted into a couple of mono-dimensional
signals (C1, C2). Several statistical measures are proposed on the basis of the
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obtained signals. In particular [53], DM1 ( Total swing ratio ), DM2 (Min/Max
growth ratio), DM3 (Last-First fingerprint signal difference mean), DM4 (Per-
centage change of standard deviation).
Ref. [56] can be considered as a prosecution of this first work, it draws up a
more complete vitality analysis on different technology of fingerprint scanner and
introduces some modifications to the original method. The dynamic of the device
can produce a saturated signal for excessive amount of wetness, in such situation
the feature DM2 lost its original efficacy. In order to avoid this drawback two
new features named DM5 (Dry saturation percentage change) and DM6 (Wet
saturation percentage change) are elaborated. With a selection of these measures,
a liveness detection on an extended database is applied in [58].
A different approach of liveness detection based on elastic deformation is re-
cently proposed by Antonelli et al. [57] : each user submitting his fingerprint
rotates it during acquisition, thus producing a voluntary deformation of the finger-
tip surface on the scanner. The system acquires consecutive frames at high frame
rate (≥ 20 fps) during the rotation of the fingertip. It has been tested that live and
fake data, due to the different composition of the skin and artificial materials, give
different elastic response to that deformation. For each user the system compiles
a ”deformation vector” from the dynamic measure. The vitality detection degree
is estimated by comparing a client acquisition with the template ones. Since this
method involves multiple frames of the same fingertip, each one representing a
different impression, this new method can be classified in both static and dynamic
methods.
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4.4.4 Summing up
As we have seen from these last paragraphs, a wide range of measures both
software-based and hardware-based are proposed in literature. Some of these in-
volve deep modifications to the entire acquisition stage of the biometric: hardware
based approaches request the complete replacement of the scanner interface while
for some software based approaches (i.e. work by Antonelli et al. [57]) a new ac-
quisition protocol is need to be implemented. The methods based only on image
processing involve a lesser degree of modifications. The integration facility of a
liveness method is important also for a major acceptability of the system to the
user. From this point of view, measures based only on image processing of the
fingerprint acquired by the scanner can be considered better than the others. For
these approaches the liveness analysis is hidden to the end user. A comprehensive
evaluation can be given only after the analysis of the performances of each meth-
ods. In the next sections we compare the entire testing protocol followed by all
these software based approaches.
4.5 An overview of the dataset
In order to guarantee a complete review of previous works in this section we ana-
lyze: (i) the different materials employed for fake stamps and the methods used for
creating them; (ii) the characteristics of the data sets used for the vitality detection
experiments. Table 4.2 deals with Item (i) for the methods we reviewed in the pre-
vious Section. Item (i) is important because the response of a certain fingerprint
scanner varies with the material adopted (e.g., gelatine or silicon). Secondly, the
intrinsic quality of the stamp depends on the material for the cast and the method
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followed for its creation. With regard to the mould materials, all those employed
are able to deceive an optical sensor, as pointed out in [36]. In particular silicone
or latex materials are more suitable than gelatine one in order to make a large set
of stamps: gelatine moulds have a shorter life and must be employed at once after
the creation. On the other hand, using silicone material is not effective for capac-
itive sensors: the water percentage in gelatine stamps gives an electrical property
more similar to the skin. The fundamental property of these materials is the re-
production capability: for example, for silicone material the parameter ”shore”
indicates the hardness of the sample. We have to consider that it is need an high
degree of softness for reproducing papillary details (less than 1mm). In Table 4.2
it is worth noting that all the approaches at the state-of-the-art used the consen-
sual method for creating the stamp. This method exploits the subject cooperation
whilst other approaches, e.g., the ones that produce a fake stamp from latent fin-
gerprints, are more complex and requires more expert knowledge [36]. Moreover,
the quality of stamps is intrinsically lower than that obtained with the consensual
method. The consensual method is used for obtaining high quality stamps, in or-
der to create a severe performance test for vitality detection. It is, in fact, easy
to see that fraudulent attacks using high quality stamps are much more difficult
to detect, whilst attacks with low quality stamps can be, in many cases, detected
without using a vitality detection module (the fake impression is rejected as an
impostor impression).
It should be noted that several variables are involved in the fraudulent access
process, in particular: (1) the initial pressure of the subject on the cast; (2) the
mould material dripped over the cast; (3) the contact of the stamp on the acquisi-
tion surface. These variables concur to alter the shape of the reproduced finger-
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Ref. Scanner Cast Material Mould material
[53] Capacitive Rubber Play-Doh
[54] Not specified Gum Gelatine
[55] Digital cam. Not specified Gelatine, Plastic clav.
[56] Optical, Electro-
optical, Capaci-
tive
Dental impression Play-Doh
[57] Optical Not specified Silicone, Gelatine, Latex
[58] Optical Plasticine Silicone
[59] Optical Not specified Play-Doh
Table 4.2: Software-based methods for fingerprint vitality detection and materials
and methods used for stamp fabrication. All the acquisitions have been collected
with consensual methods.
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Ref. No.
fakes
No. impressions No. frames Correspondence
with clients ?
[53] 18 1 2 NO
[54] 32 10 0 YES
[55] 24 1 0 NO
[56] 12 5 20 NO
[57] 33 1 2 NO
[58] 28 2 2 YES
[59] 80 1 0 NO
Table 4.3: Some key characteristics of the data set used for vitality detection ex-
periments in previous works.
print and, in some cases, these alterations strongly impact on the final quality of
the obtained image. Figure 4.3 shows some examples of fake fingerprint images
where it can be easily observed the different visual quality. It is worth noting that
no previous work has devoted much attention to this issue.
The second item we raised in this Section concerns the characteristics of the
data set used for the vitality detection experiments. Table 4.3 points out the most
important characteristics of the data sets used in previous works. The second col-
umn reports the number of different fake fingerprints (subjects), the third one the
number of impressions for each fingerprint, the fourth one the number of image
frames acquired. The fifth column points out if the subjects used for producing
stamps are the same used as clients, namely, if the data set contains both fake and
live fingerprint images for each individual.
Information reported in Table 4.3 is useful to analyze: (1) the sample size of
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(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 4.3: Examples of fake fingerprint images from Ref. [53] (a), Ref. [58] (b),
Ref. [55] (c).
data sets for fake detection rate evaluation; (2) the protocol adopted in experi-
ments.
With regard to item (1), it is worth noting that it requires several resources in terms
of volunteers, time, and personnel devoted to stamp fabrication. In particular, vol-
unteers must be trained to appropriately press their finger on the mould material,
and a visual analysis of the stamp is necessary in order to obtain good quality
images. Another important aspect is the ”reproducibility degree” of certain fin-
gerprint: some particular fingerprint patterns with thin ridge or with the presence
of micro-details are not suitable for the reproduction. Also for this, in order to
produce an acceptable stamp, many trials are require. Since the solidification of
the mould material can require several hours, this impacts on the number of fake
stamps produced per time unit. As a consequence, reported experimental results
can be affected by the small sample size of the used data set. This could cause a
not reliable estimation of the detection performance.
The differences about the above item (2), i.e., the differences of the characteristics
of the data sets, are pointed out by the fifth column of Table 4.3. The term ”corre-
spondence with client” means that for each fake image, there is the correspondent
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live image. This impacts on the experimental protocol used and the final goal of
the experimentation. In particular, works for which this correspondence is absent
are aimed to point out that the proposed feature(s) can allow to distinguish a fake
image from an alive one only. Accordingly, they do not require the presence of re-
lated clients. On the other hand, they do not allow evaluating the penetration rate
of the stamps in a verification system, that is, to assess the rate of fake fingerprints
which would be accepted as live fingerprints.
As we can see, the architecture of each dataset depends on the finality of each
related works: i.e. a correspondence between live and fake fingerprints is not need
where the liveness detection is based on an absolute measure. In these cases a set
of fake fingerprint images is compared with a set of images from live client. For
these works liveness is not an user-dependent measure but an absolute property
of the images. Other works find liveness signs as an user-dependent property:
(Table 4.3, third and sixth rows), a certain number of live and fake fingerprint
frames/impressions is captured from the same subject. This is due to the char-
acteristic of the measure, which requires the comparison of the input impression
with the related template client (e.g. elastic distortion or morphological measures
[54],[58] which require an additional minutiae extraction step), and also to the
possibility of evaluating the relationship between fake detection rate and verifica-
tion performance. In this case the protocol adopted is a little more complex, be-
cause the fake detection features can be extracted only by the comparison phase.
For example, the protocol adopted in [58] is made up of the following steps: (i)
an impression has been considered as the template of the fingerprint stored in the
system database. Generally this impression is chosen from live dataset. From
these images it is extracted a template liveness measure and the related minutiae
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set. (ii) From a second impression (as the image provided by system during ac-
cess attempt) it is extracted a client liveness measure and the minutiae set. (iii) A
matching comparison between the two set of minutiae is computed to identify a
genuine attempt and so, only for a positive match (the client is the same with the
registered user), a liveness analysis is applied.
4.6 Vitality detection performances
Table 4.4 reports a preliminary comparison of previous works in terms of overall
miss-detection (classification) rate, that is, the average between the rate of ”live”
fingerprints wrongly classified as fake ones and viceversa. Due to several prob-
lems, as the differences in terms of sensors used, data set size, protocol, and classi-
fiers, it is difficult to fairly compare these values. As an example, the work by An-
tonelli et al. [57] uses a threshold-based classifier based on the mono-dimensional
distribution of live and fake classes. This distribution has been computed by the
Euclidean distance between template and input distortion codes. The threshold
has been tuned on the ”equal error rate” value. This value is obviously different
from the overall error rate usually considered for evaluating the performance of vi-
tality detection systems. Moreover, the strong variations in error rates even when
using similar approaches (e.g. see [54] and [58] , or [53] and [56] ) suggest that
a common experimental protocol is necessary in order to avoid the difficulty in
interpreting reported results. Finally, an average error rate of 3-5 % even in small
data sets makes these systems quite unacceptable for a real integration in current
fingerprint verification systems, due to their impact on the false rejection rates (i.e.
wrongly rejected clients) which could increase. For example, the best fingerprint
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Ref. Classification method Error rate
[53] Back-propagation neural network 0%
[54] Support Vector Machine 18%
[55] Threshold 0%
[56] Neural Network, Threshold, Linear
Discriminant Analysis
6% (capacitive sensor) 3%
(electro-optical sensor) 2%
(optical sensor)
[57] Threshold 5% (equal error rate)
[58] k-NN Classifier 6%
[59] Classification Tree 5% (capacitive sensor), 13%
(optical sensor)
Table 4.4: Vitality detection performance reported in previous works.
verification system at the 2004 edition of Fingerprint Verification Competition ex-
hibited a 2 % equal error rate on average [65].
4.7 Concluding remarks
From the survey of current works on liveness detection we can notice the early
state of the results. In particular, due to the many difficulties of collecting a wide
and a statistical valid dataset, all the approaches are tested on an insignificant
number of images and this makes more difficult the interpretation of the results. In
order to generalize a performance analysis of liveness detection methods, a more
general common protocol is need : International Biometric Group, ( an interna-
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tional organization of biometric industries that provides a wide range of services
to government and private sector clients), has drawn a project ”Spoof 2007” [66]
with the purpose of creating a global network about liveness detection for biomet-
ric systems (both for fingerprint and iris technologies). The importance of this
work is to have defined a clear protocol in order to examine biometric spoofing.
The entire project is divided in two main sections: the first focuses the efforts
toward ”system resistance”, measuring the ability of a system to resist spoofing
attacks; the second is the ”spoofing effectiveness” measuring the ability of a spoof
technology to conduct a spoof attack on a biometric system. The fundamental step
of this project is the collection of a spoof library of different (wide range of materi-
als and reproduction procedures) spoof sources. The analysis is addressed also to
verification systems: it is analyzed spoof attacks both for enrollment and authen-
tication steps, defining a series of parameters for evaluating spoofing penetration
rate (Spoof Acceptance Rate, Spoof Enrollment Count etc.) This work represents
the last important contribution of the state of the art concerning liveness detection:
it defines the limit of the research until now, and draws a clear protocol for future
approaches. Our contribution has to be put into this context: from our first work
[58] and during the whole period of Doctoral studies our intention has been, on
one hand, the continuous collection of images from live and fake finger in order to
create a wide dataset on which basing our experimentations, on the other hand, the
development of new and more efficient methods of liveness detection. In the next
chapter, after the description of our last ”spoof” dataset, we draw a first approach
based on the fusion of the main typologies of liveness features. Basing on the
measure of the state-of-the-art we study the effect of the fusion of these in order
to improve the accuracy of detect spoofing attempts.
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Experimental investigation of
liveness detection methods
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have proposed a classification of the main methods
adopted in literature concerning liveness detection. We have underlined how
software-based approach represents a more acceptable solution: vitality detection
is provided by extracting some features directly from the fingerprint image. From
the taxonomy showed in the previous chapter we have seen how many types of
approaches have been developed exploiting different characteristics of the human
physiology or some intrinsic features of fingerprint images. At present, it is diffi-
cult to establish if a feature shows a detection capability better than another. We
believe that this is mainly due to the fact that performances of different features
have been assessed and compared with different acquisition sensors, and using
small data sets which could have obscured the relative merits of the features, due
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to the small sample-size issues [58]-[55]-[64]. The aim of this experimentation
is to uniformly compare the main features : each of this is applied on the same
image dataset and the results are elaborated with the same classification tool. On
the other hand, we demonstrate that using more than one feature could improve
the detection rate when a data set large enough is available. In our first paper [58]
we have started this investigation, the work presented in this Ph.D thesis can be
considered as a follow up of that preliminary work. In this chapter we focus on the
so-called dynamic and static features ( from Figure 4.1), the first sections provide a
deeper description of these two types of measure recalling the concept of ”frames”
and ”impressions” based acquisition. Following, we show the importance of the
fusion of these two types of measure in order to improve Live/fake classification
rate. To one section is dedicated the description of our reference dataset collected
at Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering (University of Cagliari).
The importance of this new mean is given by its sample numerosity and its com-
pleteness (it is drawn for both dynamic and static measure), thus allowing to draw
more reliable conclusions on tested features. We also propose novel static and dy-
namic features which can further improve the vitality detection performance. This
comparison is also aimed to identify the best feature, or the best feature subset,
for fingerprint vitality detection.
5.2 Dynamic and static features
The categorization we used in this chapter is the one proposed in the taxonomy
previously showed, and based on the concept of ”frames” and ”impression” of a
fingerprint. Frames are intended to be images captured by holding the fingertip on
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the scanner surface without moving it. Position of fingertip does not change dur-
ing acquisition. On the other hand, impressions are intended to be images captured
even at different periods of time but fingerprint can be moved during acquisition.
The extraction of dynamic features requires a time dependent analysis of finger-
print images. Basically, a multi-frame acquisition is performed while the user
holds his finger on the sensor surface. The algorithm based on dynamic features
receives as input the extracted frames of each finger and gives a vitality response
by comparing these time series images (usually only two frames are compared).
All these features are aimed to characterize and analyse the skin perspiration pro-
cess during the acquisition stage. Static features instead give a spoofing warning
by considering how multiple impressions of the same fingerprint differ: this cate-
gory of features includes deformation and statistic analysis. This approach based
on static features studies the variability of the fingerprint images during different
acquisition processes. Figure 5.1 exemplifies the basic operation mechanisms be-
hind these two vitality measures: dynamic features check vitality properties from
multiple frames extracted from one acquisition; instead static features are com-
puted from multiple acquisitions (i.e., impressions) of the same fingerprint.
Table 5.1 shows the features investigated in this experimentation. The first
column indicates the label we adopt to indicate the feature, the second column
gives a short description of the feature, the third column provides the reference
papers in which the feature has been originally proposed (the label used in those
papers to indicate the feature is also reported). The following Sections describe
these features in detail.
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Label Short description Reference
DF1 Mean value difference on the skeleton DM3[53]-[56] DF1[58]
DF2 Dry saturation fraction DM5[56] DF2[58]
DF3 Wet saturation fraction DM6[56] DF3[58]
DF4 Mean value difference on the image DF4[58]
DF5 L1-distance of the histogram DF5[58]
SF1 Elastic deformation G(P )[54] SF2[58]
SF2 Mean intra-distance value SF1[58]
SF3 grey level - mean value This experimentation
SF4 grey level standard deviation This experimentation
Table 5.1: List of vitality features investigated and correspondent bibliographic
references. The letter D indicates a dynamic feature, while the letter S a static
feature.
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Figure 5.1: Multiple frame and multiple impression acquisitions used for static
and dynamic feature extraction.
5.2.1 Dynamic features
The perspiration is a unique physiologic feature of the skin: the evaporation from
the human body through the skin pores guarantees a correct thermal-regulation.
In particular, the entire surface of the finger is characterized by the presence of a
uniform distribution of pores. While the finger is in contact with the surface of a
fingerprint-scanner this phenomenon can be observed with a slight change of the
acquired images [53]. Due to the perspiration and the contact of the finger with the
surface of the scanner the skin gets wetter and consequently the acquired images
get perceptively darker (see also Figure 5.1). This physiological phenomenon is
used as a vitality measure of the fingertip on the scanner, because it is generally
not exhibited by a fingerprint stamp, due to the perspiration phenomenon absence.
While the user keeps his finger on the scanner two images are captured with a
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time gap of about 5 seconds. On the basis of this couple of images a set of vitality
measures based on the differences extracted from the sequence is computed. The
above differences are computed using only grey level values along the ridges path,
and using these main processing steps:
• Acquisition of two frames of the same fingerprint temporally separated from
5 seconds;
• Binarization and thinning of the images;
• Creation of two mono-dimensional vectors C1 and C2 containing the grey
level values of the extracted skeletons of the two frames;
• Processing of the differences of the two signals characterized with the above
C1 and C2 vectors.
The fingerprint vitality degree is estimated from the differences computed. As
pointed out in [53] these measures strongly depend on the acquisition stage. In
particular, the output dynamic of the device strongly impacts on their reliability.
Moreover, the perspiration phenomenon is not evident at the same degree in all
persons (e.g. subjects with dry or moist fingers). In our case, the dynamic mea-
sures fitting the characteristic of the adopted optical sensor were (Table 5.1): the
time difference of the mean grey level of the skeleton (DF1), the dry saturation
percentage change (DF2), and the wet saturation percentage change (DF3). On
the basis of the analysis of the perspiration phenomenon, we proposed and imple-
mented two new dynamic measures computed on the entire image [58]: the time
difference of the mean grey level (DF4) and the L1-distance of the histograms of
two frames of the fingerprint (DF5).
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5.2.2 Static features
The static features are the measures computed by using multiple impressions of
the same fingerprint. The user repeats the acquisition of his fingerprint by re-
moving and applying in sequence the finger on the scanner. In particular, a static
feature is computed as the difference between a certain measure extracted from an
input impression (to be assigned to an identity) and the one extracted from a tem-
plate impression which is known to be from a live finger. It is worth noting that
it is more difficult to find vitality discriminant properties among two impressions
than among two frames. Many factors can alter a static measure: for example
a different pressure of the finger on the scanner surface can modify the captured
area of the fingerprint or the brightness profile of the image. The pressure can
also modify the distribution on the finger surface of the elastic deformation. A
first kind of static features is based on the elastic deformation of the skin. In par-
ticular, these features are based on the variation of the position of the minutiae
set extracted from the image. Chen and Jain [54] showed how different distortion
levels can partially be linked with the fingerprint aliveness. The rationale behind
these approaches is the following. When a finger presses on a surface, the 3D
flow of papillary ridges on the skin is leaved as a stamp on the surface as a 2D
pattern. If the finger is on a scanner surface this 2D pattern is recorded as an im-
age. The passage from 3D to 2D flow involves an elastic deformation depending,
e.g., on the softness of the fingertip, the pressure of the contact, the orientation of
the finger on the surface. For each finger there is a unique elastic response that
can return a vitality measure when compared with a plastic fake stamp. In this
work, we adopted the elastic distortion model proposed in [63] . We firstly ex-
tracted the set of minutiae from the two fingerprint impressions. By the so-called
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String matching algorithm we detected the set of correspondent minutiae. [?] In
this way we obtained two sets of ordered minutiae for two different impressions of
the same fingerprint. Given Mc = (mc1, ......,mck) and Mt = (mt1, ..........mtk)
the two minutiae sets for the comparison we first compute the Thin Plate Splines-
model (TPS) by which we obtain the complete correspondence of the two set of
minutiae.
F (Mc) = Mt (5.1)
According to the TPS model, given the set of minutiaeMc -Mt, the function that
forces the set Mc to a complete correspondence with the Mt set is described by
the following TPS formula for each point:
mt = F (mc) = c+ Amc +W
T s(mc) (5.2)
where c is a 2 x 1 translation vector, A is the 2 x 2 affine matrix, and the
third addend is related to the warping contribution: W is the (k x 2) matrix coef-
ficient and the term s() is the distance function s(mc) = [σ(mc1 −mt1), σ(mc2 −
mt2), ...σ(mck −mtk)] with the basis function σ(u) = ||u||2log(||u||), σ(u) = 0
for ||u|| = 0 . The correspondence of the two sets is generally obtained by a rigid
and elastic distortion; the entity of the elastic deformation can be summarized in
a real-value named bending energy. For a complete description of the Thin Plate
Spline model the reader is referred to [63]. Accordingly, given the (k x k) matrix
distance S, Sij = σ(mci −mcj), the expression of the minimized bending energy
we used as a fingerprint vitality feature is as follows:
BE = trace(W TSW ) (5.3)
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Besides the bending energy (SF1), we adopted the difference among the mean
values of the distances of the minutiae into a certain minutiae set (SF2). In other
words, starting from one set of correspondent minutiae we have computed the
mean of the sum of the distances with the other ones. By this parameter we collect
the information about the spatial arrangement of a fixed minutiae set for each
fingerprint image: once a template minutiae set has been established, by analysing
the values spread for different impressions we can estimate the elasticity property
of the fingerprint reproduction. More the object (fingerprint or fake stamp) is
rigid, more the set of minutiae keeps a constant value of this parameter for each
impression. Ideally a completely rigid stamp will produce always the same elastic
distortion value.
Moreover, we introduce a novel kind of static features which are based on
some statistical measures about the grey level of the image. These features are the
mean value (SF3) and the standard deviation (SF4) of the grey level of the finger-
print image (Table 5.1). They can be considered as complementary of the dynamic
ones, because they look for the same information, but in a multi-impressions con-
text. Figure illustrates a case where dynamic features are not discriminant enough
(see frames at the left hand) due to the poor contribution of the perspiration phe-
nomenon of the subject. On the other hand, the correspondent statistical features
succeed by comparing the second fake frame with the second template one, due
to the appearances differences between live and fake impressions.
A different approach of liveness detection based on elastic deformation is re-
cently proposed by Antonelli et al. [57]: each user submitting his fingerprint ro-
tates it during acquisition, thus producing a voluntary deformation of the fingertip
surface on the scanner. The system acquires consecutive frames during the rota-
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tion of the fingertip. It has been tested that live and fake data, due to the different
composition of the skin and artificial materials, give different elastic response to
that deformation. For each user the system compiles a ”deformation vector” from
the dynamic measure. The vitality detection degree is estimated by comparing
a client acquisition with the template ones. Since this method involves multiple
frames of the same fingertip, each one representing a different impression, this
new method can be classified in both static and dynamic methods. The acquisi-
tion stage of this measure does not allow to combine this with the other features:
this is not compatible neither with the dynamic measures (it is not possible to cap-
ture perspiration during the finger rotation), nor with the static features for which,
as an example, the extraction of minutiae is required. However, since this method
has shown to be promising, we are currently arranging an appropriate data set and
experimental protocol to fairly compare it with other static and dynamic features,
and this will be object of a future work.
5.3 The dataset
In order to investigate static and dynamic features, we collected a multiple-frames
/ multiple-impressions dataset. In particular, the steps involved in the creation of
this set of images from the fabrication process to the acquisition are the follow-
ings.
Step 1 - Fabrication Process
Images were acquired from 82 different fingerprints from 50 people aged between
20 and 70 and the 72 fake stamps. The lack of symmetry is due to the impos-
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Figure 5.2: A case where dynamic features are not discriminant enough (see
frames at the left hand) due to the poor contribution of the perspiration phe-
nomenon of the subject. On the other hand, the correspondent statistical features
succeed by comparing the second fake frame with the second template one, due
to the appearances differences between live and fake impressions.
sibility to reproduce some fingers with the chosen material: fingertips with very
thin ridges or with a damaged surface are very difficult to be reproduced and this
does not allow to make a readable stamp. In the fabrication process of the fake
finger we adopted the so-called consensual method, which is commonly followed
for assessing the performance of fingerprint vitality detection features. [?] The
basic steps of this process are: (1) the user put his finger on a plasticine-like mate-
rial: the pattern of the fingerprint is negative reproduced in a mould; (2) the liquid
silicon with a catalyst is dripped over the mould: the liquid covers the negative
fingerprint; (3) after some hours the solidification of the rubber is completed and
the cast can be removed from the mould; (4) the rest of the plasticine mould is
cleaned off from the surface of the cast. This procedure was repeated for each
different finger. In order to produce the replicas we used the following materials:
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for the mould we employed a plasticine-like material that offers a good malleable
property and a high stability in the time, for the cast we used a two-compound
mixture of liquid silicone and a catalyst. The material of the cast is a high flexibil-
ity siliconic resin (SILGUMHF) with a very low linear shrinkage, less than 0.1 %
(this is particular important for the reproduction of the details of a fingerprint with
a dimension below a millimetre). The liquid catalyst (Stanne, Dibutyltin dilaurate)
must be mixed with the silicone material with a percentage of 5%. Besides the
high quality of replicas, the choice of the stamp material is suggested by the tech-
nology of the fingerprint scanner adopted: given the high opacity of the silicone
material is particularly suitable for optical scanners that employ Frustrated Total
Internal Reflection (FTIR). Another property of silicone material is the durability
of its elasticity properties. On the basis of these considerations, we preferred the
silicone material to another cheap opaque material like wood super glue: when
the glue dried the stamp tends to crack. The obtained stamps are therefore charac-
terised by high reproduction quality and particularly effective to deceive an optical
sensor.
Step 2 - Acquisition Process
For the acquisition of the fingerprint images we used the Biometrika FX2000
optical sensor with an acquisition area of 25x13.2 mm2. The size of images is
312x372 pixels. Each user was required to repeat for 20 times the acquisition of
his fingerprint. For each acquisition a couple of time-frames at 0 and 5 seconds
has been extracted. At the end of the acquisition process we have collected 3280
”live” images (82 fingers x 20 acquisitions x 2 frames) and 2880 images from fake
stamps (72 stamps x 20 acquisitions x 2 frames). Both high and low quality im-
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ages have been included in the collection. The main features of our dataset w.r.t.
data sets collected by other researchers are:
• A large sample size. As an example, the data set of Derakshani et al. [53]
is comprised by 54 live and fake finger images, in Chen et al.[54] 640 live
and fake images were collected. Our data set is comprised by 1640 live
and 1440 fake finger images. By considering the second frame of each
image, the overall dataset doubles its size. Another wide dataset proposed
by Galbally [61] does not include multiple frames of the same fingerprint
impression. Thus, it is not possible to use it as a data set for comparing
static and dynamic features.
• In order to test both dynamic and static feature the dataset includes different
impressions and different frames from each acquired finger/stamp.
• The dataset is comprised by high and low quality images. This wide range
of quality values permits to testing the measures over different images and
then to generalizing the results.
Step 3 Automatic Quality Assessment by NIST software
The quality of live fingerprint images is given by several factors: conformation of
the live fingertip surface, quality of the sensor, etc. [67]. For artificial fingers, we
have to consider also the fabrication quality of the stamp. A specific fingerprint
image quality measure can be computed by the well known NIST quality checking
algorithm [67]. Figure 5.3 shows the results of the NIST quality check on our data
set. The algorithm assigned one of the five NIST quality levels to each fingerprint
image. We can observe the wide spread of distribution from high quality level to
the lowest.
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Figure 5.3: Quality classification of the images of our dataset. The five qual-
ity levels have been assigned by the NIST software Quality classification of the
images of our dataset. The five quality levels have been assigned by the NIST
software.
5.4 Experimental result
5.4.1 Experimental protocol
In order to extract static and dynamic features from fingerprint images, we adopted
the following protocol.
• One live fingerprint impression for each client has been used as template
image.
• Both for static and dynamic measure we have extracted a difference measure
coming from template image and the related client. Where the measure
does not need a specific couple of images (as for elastic deformation) an
arithmetic difference has been computed from the two separated measures
applied to the template and the client images.
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• DynamicMeasures: we have computed the five dynamic measures (DF1..DF5)
for the extracted vectors C1 (at 0 sec.) and C2 (at 5 sec.) from each cou-
ples of frames. The difference between the value from template couple and
client one have been computed.
• Static Measures: measures from SF2 to SF4 have been computed sepa-
rately from each template and client image. As the bending energy con-
cerns, the elastic measure has been applied to the couple template-client
images.
• Each difference feature has been normalized as follows:
f
(n)
i =
fi − µi
σi
(5.4)
Where f (n)i is the i-th normalised feature (i = 1, ..., 9), µi and σi are the
mean and the standard deviation of fi over all available patterns.
Thus, we obtained 1558 feature vectors comprised by nine static and dynamic
measures from live images, 1440 feature vectors from fake images.
In our work, we did not include the method by Antonelli et al. based on the
”distortion-code” [57]. In fact, it is not possible to extract distortion-code be-
cause the investigated system used multiple frames and impressions pointed out
in Figure 5.1. Static and dynamic features are compared fairly, because they are
extracted in the same acquisition session in which user releases two frames of the
same impression. The Antonelli et al.’s method needs an additional acquisition
step, separated from that for other static and dynamic features, because, for ex-
ample, it is not possible to capture perspiration measures during distortion-code
acquisition. Accordingly, comparison of distortion-code performance and other
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features could not be considered fair. Currently, we are arranging an appropri-
ate protocol to fairly compare static and dynamic features with Antonelli et al.’s
method, and this will be object of a future work.
5.4.2 Feature analysis
Table 5.2 reports the correlation coefficient of the investigated features on the
whole data set. It is easy to note that all the considered features are lowly cor-
related, on average. However, there are some small differences. As an example,
DF1 and DF4 exhibit a similar behavior in general, but their correlation differ-
ence with DF5 allows to hypothesise their combination could improve perfor-
mance (correlation difference of DF1, DF5 and of DF4, DF5 is more relevant
than that with other features). Among the static features, SF1 exhibits the lowest
average correlation coefficient. In general, Table 5.2 confirms the results reported
in [58], where the same sensor and material have been used for testing, but in this
case the statistical significance of results is greatest due to the larger size of the
data set used.
Figure 5.4 reports the range of values of each feature, and the degree of sta-
tistical separation between live and fake classes estimated by the so-called class
separation statistic CSS [62], which is computed as follow:
CSSi =
∫
|p(fi|FAKE)− p(fi|LIV E)|dfi (5.5)
Where CSSi is the class-separation statistic value estimated for the i-th fea-
ture, p(fi|FAKE) and p(fi|LIV E) are the distribution of the i-th feature given
the fake and live classes, respectively. We estimated these distributions by the nor-
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malized histograms method, also adopted in [?]. Thirty equally spaced intervals
were used for each feature. With regard to the state-of-the-art perspiration-based
features (DF1, DF2, DF3), we can notice a similar behavior. All these mea-
sures are overlapped and also the differences between mean values are strongly
slight. This behaviour is observable also with the new dynamic measure DF4
while DF5 shows a lower overlap between fake and live values. Both DF1 and
DF5 have the same C.S.S. test value but the first have a worst difference among
live and fake mean values. Among static features, while SF1 and SF2 show a be-
haviour similar to the dynamic ones, both SF3 and SF4 have the best separation
class separation values. The difference with the results showed in Parthasaradhi
et al. [56] are probably due to factors as the small sample size issue affecting
their dataset, or the dynamic difference of the optical sensors used: in this case,
reported results contributes to point out the sensitivity of the perspiration-based
measures which have to be carefully selected in dependence of the used capture
device.
In order to provide further evidences, we report in Figure 5.5 the accuracy
of individual features using the nearest neighbour classifier and the leave-one-out
method for assessing the accuracy. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare our
results with that in [54],[53],[56] because no details on the best features have been
reported in those papers. However, it is possible to compare some results with
those reported in [58]. In general, we notice that the worst features are those with
lowest class-separation statistic values (DF2, DF3, SF1,SF2). Both relative
accuracy among features agreed with [58], but overall performance is notably
different. These differences can be explained by considering that a small sample
size issue probably affected the dataset in [58], thus related results could have
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C.S.S. 0.51    0.48     0.33      0.29     0.51     0.33      0.25     0.93     0.82
Figure 5.4: Range of values for all the features on live dataset (solid line) and on
fake dataset (dashed line).
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DF2 DF3 DF4 DF5 SF1 SF2 SF3 SF4
DF1 0.02 -0.07 0.77 0.34 -0.10 -0.05 0.04 0.14
DF2 — 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.04
DF3 — — -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02
DF4 — — — 0.53 -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.14
DF5 — — — — -0.03 0.07 -0.16 -0.08
SF1 — — — — — 0.03 0.08 0.02
SF2 — — — — — — -0.14 -0.12
SF3 — — — — — — — 0.42
Table 5.2: Correlation coefficient of static and dynamic features.
been over estimated [64].
Tables 5.3-5.4 report the percentage accuracy of best group of static and dy-
namic features. Groups have been selected by an exhaustive search over all possi-
ble subsets of adopted features. Each row of Tables 5.3-5.4 shows the best subset
of features. It is possible to see that static and dynamic features exhibit the same
performance accuracy when used together (Tables 5.3-5.4, last rows). However, it
is reasonable to argue that they are able to recognize different subsets of the data
set, that is, they could exhibit a certain degree of complementarity, which could
be also suggested by their low average correlation coefficient shown in Table 5.2
(even if low correlation does not necessarily implies high complementarity).
Accordingly, we investigated the best subsets of features when using both
static and dynamic ones and showed the related accuracy in Figure 6. Even in this
case, an exhaustive search over all possible features subsets have been performed.
It is easy to see that the best result is achieved when using two static features
78
CHAPTER 5
DF1 DF2 DF3 DF4 DF5 SF1 SF2 SF3 SF440
45
50
55
60
65
70
Feature
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 [%
]
Figure 5.5: Accuracy percentage for each feature (black -dynamic features, grey -
static features).
(SF3, SF4) and all dynamic ones. A sharp performance improvement has been
obtained. Generally we can observe a strong improvement with the use of multi-
ple features (Figures 5.5-5.6). Two observations can be also drawn from Figure
5.6: (i) it is very difficult to exploit the elastic deformation differences between
fake and live images (its contribute is negligible) this could be due to the different
distortion features of our stamps with respect to those of the gummy replicas by
Chen and Jain [54]; (ii) perspiration-based features, which exhibit a high accu-
racy variation used alone [58]-[56] increase the performance notably when used
together. This means that they are so complementary that image characteristics
missed by a feature can be captured by another one.
It can be noted that in Figure 5.6, the curse of dimensionality effect (the per-
formance of the system drops once a certain number of features is reached) cannot
79
CHAPTER 5
be observed. This is possible but not very common in feature selection problems.
As previously pointed out, we performed an exhaustive search over all possible
features subsets. Therefore, the effect of the curse of dimensionality[64] could
be reduced. Other reasons can be referred (and worthy of investigations) to the
representativeness of the data set (about 3000 samples covering possible fake and
live fingerprint variations), the number of features not so large (less than 10), the
small number of classes (2) and also to the fact that we adopted a leave-one-out
classification strategy, which strongly decreased the spread off of training samples
on the feature space because only one sample is always considered as test sample
(as performing averaging on 3000-fold cross validation). From Figure 5.4, which
shows the amount of overlapping between classes, it can be noticed the ranges of
values for each feature are about the same, and cover uniformly the same amount
of feature space. Worth noting, accuracy starts dropping when number of features
is reaching the maximum (Figure 5.6): this can be explained with the addition of
noisy features, maybe dependent on some outliers, which bring the sample to a re-
gion of features space not well covered by captured samples. In our opinion, these
explanations does not explain the fact satisfactorily, and further investigations are
needed to evaluate the impact of curse of dimensionality in this application.
Finally, we showed in Tables 5.5-5.6 the best features subsets when separately
combining the state-of- the-art features and the ones we proposed in [58] and in
this work. A better performance is obtained with the features we are proposing,
thus confirming the suggestion reported in [56] about the need of novel measures
exploiting the differences between live and fake fingerprint images. As shown in
Figure 5.6 the classification performance can be further improved by using them
together.
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Accuracy [%] Subset
56.80 DF1
60.74 DF4-DF5
65.38 DF1-DF4-DF4
67.88 DF1-DF2-DF4-DF5
71.71 DF1-DF2-DF3-DF4-DF5
Table 5.3: Percentage accuracy of dynamic features.
Accuracy [%] Subset
65.34 SF3
73.42 SF3-SF4
73.18 SF1-SF3-SF4
72.11 SF1-SF2-SF3-SF4
Table 5.4: Percentage accuracy of static features.
Accuracy [%] Subset
56.80 DF1
60.11 DF1-DF2
62.48 DF1-DF2-DF3
63.58 DF1-DF2-DF3-SF1
Table 5.5: Percentage accuracy for state-of-the-art features.
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1 !   SF3
2 !   SF3 ! SF4
3 !   DF3 ! SF3 ! SF4
4 !   DF2 ! DF4 ! SF3 ! SF4
5 !   DF1 ! DF2 ! DF4 ! SF3 ! SF4
6 !   DF1 ! DF2 ! DF4 ! DF5 ! SF3 ! SF4
7 !   DF1 ! DF2 ! DF3 ! DF4 ! DF5 ! SF3 ! SF4
8 !   DF1 ! DF2 ! DF3 ! DF4 ! DF5 ! SF1 ! SF3 ! SF4
9 !   ALL
Figure 5.6: Overall percentage accuracy for feature subsets with cardinality from
1 to 9.
Accuracy [%] Subset
65.34 SF3
73.42 SF3-SF4
74.25 DF5-SF3-SF4
77.75 DF4-DF5-SF3-SF4
75.35 DF4-DF5-SF2-SF3-SF4
Table 5.6: Percentage accuracy for proposed features.
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Advanced morphologic features for
liveness detection
6.1 Introduction
From results presented in the previous chapter we can observe that: (i) the best fea-
tures derive from measures disjointed from physiological or physics properties of
the user but directly linked to properties of the image (SF3 and SF4 give higher
accuracy values), (ii) the use of multiple features involves an evident increase of
classification accuracy (from Figure 5.6 of about 30%). The first item can be ex-
plained from the irregular behavior of the physiological measures. Perspiration
and elastic deformation of the skin are user-dependent features, not uniformly
distributed in the population: some human diseases can alter the thermoregulation
process, thus increasing or reducing the wetness of the skin. At the same time the
hardness of the skin can influence clearly elastic properties of the tissue. For this
reason it is not simple to find a correlation between such measures and liveness
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detection ability. Item two is explained by the effect of the features fusion on the
classification process: classification by means of different uncorrelated features
can provide better results. In order to overcome the use of multiple features (thus
simplifying the recognition process ), we have addressed our research toward the
investigation on features which have, alone, high fake-live discrimination power.
In particular we have considered two morphologic measures. As described in the
following sections, such measures exploit some intrinsic properties of the image:
the first one, in the space domain, is based on the analysis of the differences of
ridges width from a ”live” template and an unknown client; the second one, pre-
sented in [68], analyzes morphologic changes in the frequencies domain. Both
of these measures are based on properties of the digital image (i.e. the high fre-
quency in 2D-Fourier space) or on some changes involved by the fabrication of
the stamps (i.e. the variation of ridge width from a live fingerprint to a fake one).
By following the consideration at item (i), both of these features presented in this
Ph.D thesis are user-independent.
6.2 Morphologic analysis in the space domain
6.2.1 Introduction
Figure 6.1 suggests the possibility of using the ridge width as vitality detection
feature, as the ridges of a fake image are often very different from those of a live
image. In our preliminary work [58] we have presented a liveness feature based
on ridge width information: for each image it was computed a ridge width mean
value. Although this static feature have the best accuracy among the other static
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shown in Figure 1, points out that the stamp fabrication process strongly impacts on 
some characteristics of the fingerprint image acquired. In particular, the ridges of a 
fake image (Figure 1b) are often very different from those of a live image (Figure 1a).  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 1. Live fingerprint image (a) and correspondent, that is, related to the same finger of the 
same subject, fake fingerprint image (b). 
Accordingly, in this paper, we propose the analysis of the ridge width of a 
fingerprint image. To this end, we developed further a preliminary method than that 
we introduced in a previous work [3].  
The feature SF3 showed in [3] is computed as the mean of the ridge width over the 
entire image: the low accuracy value of this single feature suggested the insufficient 
efficacy of this single measure. In order to improve the classification rate, in this 
work, we have computed the mean value of the ridge width according to an 
appropriate mask. Instead of a mono dimensional feature we compile a feature vector 
that includes in addition the spatial distribution of the width values. 
Furthermore the efficacy of this new feature has been proved  with experimental 
results on a home-made data set larger than those used in previous. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly overviews the state-of-the-art 
approaches to fingerprint vitality detection. Section 3 describes the proposed method. 
Section 4 shows the experimental results and preliminary conclusions are drawn in 
Section 5. 
2 A brief overview of fingerprint vitality detection methods 
The first attempts of spoofing biometric system [1] have questioned one of the 
fundamental principles of the identification by fingerprints: uniqueness.   
The possibility of deceiving a biometric system through an artificial finger has 
catched the attention of many academic and industrial groups. Hardware and software 
based solutions have been integrated in existing verification system, although the 
problem is still in an initial stage. Whilst the first ones (heartbeat detection, 
multispectral analysis of the skin tissues…) offer the best accuracy [4-5] the software 
ones are more flexible solutions besides they are less intrusive and cheaper. With this 
technology the vitality detection is carried out by the analysis of the acquired images 
of the fingerprint.  
Three main typologies of imaging examination can be distinguished: perspiration, 
elastic deformation and morphological test. 
Figure 6.1: Live fingerprint image (a) and correspondent, that is, related to the
same finger of the same subject, fake fingerprint image (b).
ones, the classification capability of this is not enough for a real biometric sys-
tems. The averaging over the whole images reduce the classification accuracy of
the feature. From this, the necessity of developing a more efficient liv ness mea-
sure based on this morphologic property of the fingerprint pattern. The use of
the ridge width as feature for fingerprint vitality detection comes from the anal-
ysis of the steps followed for the stamp fabrication. The phases of the ”consen-
sual” method are summarised in the following: (1) The subject put his finger on
a plasticine-like material for creating the mould consisting in the fingerprint neg-
ative. This step alters the ridge width due to the mould material hardness, the
fingertip consistency, the pressure imposed.
(2) These moulds are filled with liquid silicon rubber to create wafer-thin silicon
replicas. About one day is necessary for the solidification of the rubber. The ridge
width can be altered by the viscosity and the elastic stability of the silicon.
(3) During the acquisition process, the stamp is pressed over the sensor surface.
This further impacts on the ridge width of the obtained image. It is easy to show
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that similar conditions hold even if fingerprints are reproduced by non-consensual
methods, as the reproduction from latent fingerprints. In this case, the reproduc-
tion of the mask for the lithography (photography of the fingerprint, digital bina-
rization of the image and printing on the transparency) can introduce a perceptible
width bias.
6.2.2 Ridge width extraction
The global approach of ridge width estimation proposed in [58] showed a not ade-
quate live-fake discrimination. In order to overcome this limit, we proposed a new
approach based on a trade-off between a local measure (the punctual ridge width)
and a global one: the averaging of the ridge width is applied over a tessellation
of the entire image. The resulting vector is composed by the ordered mean ridge
width values extracted from each sectors specified by the tessellation. Thus, the
ordered vectors holds the spatial location of the computed main ridge width value.
In order to apply this measure we consider a limited region centered at a reference
point of the fingerprint image. In this work we used a circular area, but other
shapes can be used as well (e.g. a square region). A tessellation similar to that
proposed in [69] was adopted. For each sector of the tessellation, we computed
a local average of the width ridges. An example of tessellation is given in Figure
6.2.
The main steps of our feature extraction algorithm are:
1 Choose a reference point in the image;
2 Consider a circular mask divided into Ns sectors;
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(core, delta...) we have a maximum of the spatial variation of the orientation vectors. 
In order to return only one reference point we considered the center of mass of all 
these revealed discontinuity points.  
The visual analysis of all the images of our home-made data set (Section 4.1) 
showed that this method guarantees a good localization accuracy of the reference 
point, in particular for images with “close” singularity points. 
 
Creation of the mask. The next step of the procedure concerns the creation of the 
tessellation mask. A circular region is subdivided into a fixed number of sectors and 
centered at the reference point extracted. The size of the entire mask and of each 
sector is aimed to optimize the accuracy of the measure. The size of the tessellation 
must satisfy two requirements: firstly, a sector must be wide enough to enclose more 
than one ridges and so returns a more reasonable average width value; secondly the 
number of sectors must be large enough to improve the accuracy in details of the 
tessellation: a large number of sectors allows obtaining a mask that faithfully 
reproduces the morphology of the image. 
 
Fig. 3. Circular mask with 32 sectors. 
Computation of the ridge width: The measure of ridge width and in general of the 
intra-distance between two consecutive ridges has had an importance in the sizing of 
denoising filter as shown by O’Gorman in [14] and by Yin at al. [15].  
An initial morphologic algorithm is applied to the image in order to extract the 
skeleton from the ridge flow of the fingerprint (Figure 4a). The erosion reduce each 
ridge to a 1-pixel line. Then, from the original gray level image it is computed the 
flow directional field. For each point we obtain the mean value of the direction of the 
ridge flow !(i,j). In order to avoid local discontinuities we have considered a grid 
quantization of 15x15 block size. Starting from each point of the skeleton we have 
traced the gray level profile along the orthogonal direction to the ridge flow. As it is 
Figure 6.2: Circular mask with 32 sectors.
3 Compute the width of the ridge along the fingerprint skeleton;
4 Ext act a feature vector of Ns elements by av ragin the values within the
Ns sectors.
5 Parameters tuning.
Refer nce oint. Almost all the procedures presented in the literature [20]
for core detection are based on the analysis of the orientation field. For example,
the Poincare´ index method is one of the principal singularity extraction method.
In this work we used a core detection method based on the identification of the
discontinuities of the orientation field. The idea is that in correspondence of a sin-
gularity of a fingerprint (core, delta...) we have a maximum of the spatial variation
of the orientation vectors. In order to return only one reference point we consid-
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ered the center of mass of all revealed discontinuity points. The visual analysis
of all the images of our home-made data set showed that this method guarantees
a good localization accuracy of the reference point, in particular for images with
close singularity points.
Creation of the mask. The next step of the procedure concerns the creation of the
tessellation mask. A circular region is subdivided into a fixed number of sectors
and centered at the reference point extracted. The size of the entire mask and of
each sector is aimed to optimize the accuracy of the measure. The size of the tes-
sellation must satisfy two requirements: firstly, a sector must be wide enough to
enclose more than one ridges in order to return a more reasonable average width
value; secondly, the number of sectors must be large enough to improve the ac-
curacy in details of the tessellation: a large number of sectors allows obtaining a
mask that faithfully reproduces the morphology of the image. In our experiment
we have considered masks with 4 to 32 sectors.
Computation of the ridge width. The measure of ridge width and in general of the
intra-distance between two consecutive ridges has had an importance in the sizing
of denoising filter as shown by O’Gorman in [70] and by Yin at al. [71]. An ini-
tial morphologic algorithm is applied to the image in order to extract the skeleton
from the ridge flow of the fingerprint (Figure 6.3a). The erosion reduce each ridge
to a 1-pixel line. Then, from the original gray level image it is computed the flow
directional field. For each point we obtain the mean value of the direction of the
ridge flow θ(i, j). In order to avoid local discontinuities we have considered a
grid quantization of 15x15 block size. Starting from each point of the skeleton we
have traced the gray level profile along the orthogonal direction to the ridge flow.
As it is schematized in the third sketch of Figure 6.3, the signal extracted has
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schematized in the third sketch of Figure 4, the signal extracted has lower (higher) 
values  in correspondence of the ridge (valley). 
From these signals we esteem the ridge width as the interval where the signal is 
under a fixed threshold. 
 
(a)
w
(c)
(is ,js)
(b)
 
 
Fig. 4. Main steps for the computation of the local ridge width: (a) extraction of the 
skeleton from the image, (b) orientation field, (c) estimation of the width for each 
point of the ridge. 
 
Feature extraction. The local measure of the ridge is an evaluation too much 
refined in order to search a spoofing attempt. We can observe a high variation of this 
local measure among different impressions for the same fingerprint. In order to 
consider a more effective width measure we averaged the values of the local quantity 
along each sector of the mask previously defined. The proposed feature vector 
contains the mean value of the ridge width for each sector of the circular area. Given a 
mask with Ns sectors, we can represent the K-th component of this feature vector [W1, 
…W Ns] with the following expression: 
KK
SjijiwW != ,),,( "  (1) 
where SK is one of the Ns  sectors of the mask. 
 
Figure 6.3: Main steps for the computation of the local ridge width: (a) extraction
of the skeleton from the image, (b) orientation field, (c) estimation of the width
for each point of the ridge.
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lower (higher) values in correspondence of the ridge (valley). The ridge width has
been estimated as the interval where the signal is under a fixed threshold.
Feature extraction. The local estimation of the ridge width have an high variability
along the pattern of the fingerprint: inside the same pattern there are areas with
different ridge thickness. Moreover, depending on the pressure of the fingertip on
the sensor, we can observe a high variation of this local measure among different
impressions of the same fingerprint. In order to consider a more effective width
measure we averaged the values of the local quantity along each sector of the
mask previously defined. The proposed feature vector contains the mean value of
the ridge width for each sector of the circular area. Given a mask with Ns sectors,
we can represent the K-th component of this feature vector [W1, ...WNs ] with the
following expression:
Wk = 〈w(i, j, θ)〉 i, j ∈ Sk (6.1)
where SK is one of the Ns sectors of the mask.
Parameters tuning. The last step of the feature extraction scheme is the sizing of
the mask, in particular, the radius and the number of sectors. Two approaches
are possible to this aim. First, considering that the average inter-ridge distance
is approximately 10 pixels for a 500 dpi images (as it is reported in literature
[69] ), we can consider a radius and a number of sectors such that each sub-
region includes a significant number of ridges: for instance, for a radius of 200
pixels and a mask with 16 sectors, the linear dimensions of the widest sectors
is approximately of 100 pixels (along the radius direction) and about 80 pixels
(along the circumference). This values are high enough in comparison with the
main intra-ridge distance. The second approach is based on the estimation of
90
CHAPTER 6
the two parameters through a validation set. The radius and the number of sectors
maximize the classification accuracy on a fixed validation set. Obviously, samples
in this set must be representative of the expected user population.
6.3 Morphologic analysis in the frequency domain
6.3.1 Preliminary remarks
In our opinion, no work at the state-of-the-art paid enough attention to the stamp
characteristics achievable by using a certain material, and the quality of the stamps
has been neglected so far. However, a simple visual analysis of high quality finger-
print images coming from stamps obtained with liquid silicon rubber (Figure 6.4)
shows that there are some differences between live and fake fingerprint images.
Such differences are mainly due to the stamp fabrication process which causes
an alteration of the frequency high-level details between ridges and valleys, al-
though the main properties of the fingerprint (minutiae location, ridge frequency)
are unaltered. From this point of view, it is worth noting that although the Fourier
transform is widely used in fingerprint image enhancement, classification, match-
ing and quality evaluation [20], no work proposed features using this transform
to distinguish live and fake fingerprints. The use of a study of ”live” and ”fake”
fingerprint characteristics in the frequency domain is motivated by the above dif-
ferences that cannot be captured by a human expert or state-of-the-art approaches
for fingerprint vitality detection, unless using very high-definition electronic scan-
ners [55]. Accordingly, in this chapter, we propose a novel feature based on the
Fourier transform analysis for the fingerprint vitality detection when fake stamps
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are made up of liquid silicon rubber. This approach is tested on a commonly
used fingerprint image scanner. Reported experiments have been carried out on
a home-made data set made up of 1440 fake and live fingerprint images acquired
with an optical sensor. Results show that the proposed feature exhibits a high
vitality detection accuracy.
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simple visual analysis of high quality fingerprint images coming from stamps obtained with liquid silicon 
rubber (Figure 1) shows that there are some differences between live and fake fingerprint images. Such 
differences are mainly due to the stamp fabrication process which causes an alteration of the frequency high-
level details between ridges and valleys, although the main properties of the fingerprint (minutiae location, 
ridge frequency) are unaltered. From this point of view, it is worth noting that although the Fourier transform 
is widely used in fingerprint image enhancement, classification, matching and quality evaluation [1], no 
work proposed features using this transform to distinguish live and fake fingerprints. The use of a study of 
“live” and “fake” fingerprint characteristics in the frequency domain is motivated by the above differences 
that cannot be captured by a human expert or state-of-the-art approaches for fingerprint vitality detection, 
unless using very high-definition electronic scanners [6].  
Accordingly, in this paper, we propose a novel feature based on the Fourier transform analysis for the 
fingerprint vitality detection when fake stamps are made up of liquid silicon rubber. This approach is tested 
on a commonly used fingerprint image scanner. Reported experiments have been carried out on a home-
made data set made up of 1,440 fake and live fingerprint images acquired with an optical sensor. Results 
show that the proposed feature exhibits a high vitality detection accuracy. 
 
  
  
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure 1. Live and fake fingerprint images of the same finger (a-b). (c-d) Zoomed region from (a-b) in which 
it can be noted that high frequency details in the live image (c) are removed or strongly reduced in the fake 
image (d). 
2 Fingerprint vitality detection in the frequency domain 
In the commonly adopted process for generating fake stamps, namely, the so-called “consensual” method, 
the subject put his finger on a plasticine-like material. [1-5] These moulds are then filled with liquid silicon 
rubber to create wafer-thin silicon replicas. About one day is necessary for the solidification of the rubber. It 
is easy to observe from Figure 1 that live and fake images exhibit some differences. Whilst the ridge-valley 
periodicity is not altered by the reproduction process, the main differences can be observed in the ridge 
profiles: some micro-characteristics, observable in Figure 1(c), and due to the roughness of the skin or to the 
ridge line discontinuity, are less defined in Figure 1(d), as very small cuts of ridge lines increase their 
thickness (e.g. the transversal cut of Figure 1(c-d)). Consequently, high frequency details can be removed or 
strongly reduced. This can be analysed by computing the modulus of the related Fourier transform of the 
images, also called “power spectrum”, as shown in Figure 2. It is evident that the live image exhibits more 
than one “mode” at a range of frequencies higher than that of the fake image. Therefore, analysing live and 
fake patterns in the frequency domain can be useful to extract novel features for vitality detection. 
Let X(i,j) and XF(u,v) be the input fingerprint image and the related Fourier transform, respectively. Let ES 
the energy of X computed for the frequencies of a given region S: 
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S
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The integration region S is given in terms of a circular region centred on the null frequencies along both axis. 
The radius of the region is indicated with R (spatial frequency units). In the following, we indicated with 
Figure 6.4: Live and fake fingerprint images of the same finger (a-b). (c-d)
Zoomed region from (a-b) in which it can be noted that high frequency details
in the liv imag (c) are removed or s rongly r duced in the ake image (d).
6.3.2 Fingerprint vitality detection n the frequency do ain
In the comm nly adopted proces or generating fake stamps, namely, the so-
called consensual method, the subject put his finger on a plasticine-like material.
These moulds ar the filled with liquid silicon rubber to create afer-thin silicon
replicas. About one day is necessary for the solidification of the rubber. It is easy
to observe from Figure 6.4 that live and fake images exhibit some differences.
Whilst the ridge-valley periodicity is not altered by the reproduction process, the
main differences can be observed in the ridge profiles: some micro-characteristics,
observable in Figure 6.4(c), and due to the roughness of the skin or to the ridge line
discontinuity, are less defined in Figure 6.4(d), as very small cuts of ridge lines
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increase their thickness (e.g. the transversal cut of Figure 6.4(c-d)). Consequently,
high frequency details can be removed or strongly reduced. This can be analysed
by computing the modulus of the related Fourier transform of the images, also
called ”power spectrum”, as shown in Figure 6.5.
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“High Frequency Energy” (HFE) the integral of 
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 computed in the region out of S. This measure 
quantifies the amount of “residual” spectrum on the high frequencies. The rationale is that the HFE measure 
can characterise the information which distinguish fake and live fingerprints, as high frequency 
characteristics of fake fingerprints can be modified due to the reproduction process (Figure 1) and this is 
pointed out by their power spectrum (Figure 2). 
3     Experimental results 
3.1 Data set 
We evaluated the discriminant power of the HFE feature on a home-made data set. This is made up of 
fingerprint images coming from thirty-six different individuals. The related thirty-six stamps created by the 
consensual method allowed us to obtain the correspondent fake fingerprint patterns [1-4]. For each subject 
we captured twenty impressions, thus obtaining 720 fake images and 720 live images. It is worth noting that 
our data set is larger than other data sets used for vitality detection experiments [2-4]. For example, the data 
set used in [2] is made up of thirty-three live finger images and thirty-three fake finger images. 
In the fabrication process of the “fake finger” we adopted the so-called “consensual” method, which is 
commonly followed for assessing the performance of fingerprint vitality detection features [2-6]. The basic 
steps of this process are: (1) the user put his finger on a plasticine-like material: the pattern of the fingerprint 
is negative reproduced in a mould; (2) the liquid silicon with a catalyst is dripped over the mould: the liquid 
covers the negative fingerprint; (3) after some hours the solidification of the rubber is completed and the cast 
can be removed from the mould; (4) the rest of the plasticine mould is cleaned off from the surface of the 
cast. This procedure was repeated for each of the hirty-six different fingers. 
Fingerprint images were acquired by an optical sensor, amely, the Biometrika FX2000, also used for the 
Fingerprint Verification Competition. [1] The images size is 312x372 pix ls t 569 dpi. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2. Modula of the Fourier transform of Figures 1(a-b). Lighter pixels represent higher modula values. 
3.2 Performance assessment 
Figure 3 shows the range of values of HFE measures, computed on the whole data set, for live and fake 
fingerprint images. The average, the minimum and the maximum values are reported for each value of R (the 
radius of the region), which ranges between 0 and int[min(W,H)/2], where W and H are the image sizes. It is 
easy to see that the HFE range is such that the separation between fake and live fingerprint classes increases 
with high values of R. This can be explained by the fact that the “residual” details coming from the high 
frequencies are progressively filtered in the fake images, thus their power spectrum is significantly lower 
than that of live images.  
 
Figure 6.5: Modula of the Fourier transform of Figures 6.4(a-b). Lighter pixels
represent higher modula values.
It is evident that the live image exhibits more than one ”mode” at a range
of frequencies higher than th t of the fake image. Therefore, analysing live and
fake patterns in the frequency domain can be useful to extract novel features for
vitality detection. LetX(i, j) andXF (u, v) be the input fingerprint image and the
related Fourier transform, respectively. Let ES the energy of X computed for the
frequencies of a given region S:
Es =
∫ ∫
S
|XF (u, v)|2dudv (6.2)
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The integration region S is given in terms of a circular region centred on the
null frequencies along both axis. The radius of the region is indicated with R
(spatial frequency units). In the following, we indicated with ”High Frequency
Energy” (HFE) the integral of |XF (u, v)|2 computed in the region out of S. This
measure quantifies the amount of ”residual” spectrum on the high frequencies.
The rationale is that the HFE measure can characterise the information which
distinguish fake and live fingerprints, as high frequency characteristics of fake
fingerprints can be modified due to the reproduction process (Figure 6.4) and this
is pointed out by their power spectrum (Figure 6.5).
6.4 The dataset
The performance test for both the morphologic measures is applied to a dataset
created in the laboratory of the Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department
of the University of Cagliari. The dataset is a wide collection of high quality
images of fake fingerprint and the correspondent ones from live subjects. For the
creation of the set we used the Biometrika FX2000 optical sensor. The acquired
images have a dimension of 312x372 pixels. Images of the set have been acquired
from 36 different fingers of a male population aged between 20 and 40. The fake
fingers have been created with the consensual method . For each finger and its
corresponding fake replica 20 different impressions have been acquired. A quality
selection is applied in order to select only well defined fingerprint images. This
last point is essential in order to correctly test both the ridge width and the power
spectrum measures.
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6.5 Performance assessment and results
6.5.1 In the space domain
In order to preliminarily assess the effectiveness of the proposed morphologic
method, we carried out experiments using the nearest neighbour classifier and the
leave-one-out method. Figure 6.6 shows the accuracy of the proposed vitality
detection feature as function of the mask radius and the number of sectors (the
number of sectors sets the size of the proposed feature vector). The radius ranged
from 1/7 and 4/7 of the minimum image size. It is worth noting that the best
results are obtained when the radius is around 200 pixels independently on the
number of sectors. From the plot the best accuracy is obtained with a mask with
16 sectors, but it is worth noting that it is possible to achieve higher accuracy
(> 80%) not considering the 8 inner sectors of the mask. In this case we exclude
from the measure the smallest sectors.
Two observations can be drawn:
- the mask size must be large enough to cover approximately all image but
disregarding the noisiest portions of it (e.g. the ones near to the background,
which are subjected to elastic distortion more than inner ones);
- the number of sectors must be such that the estimation of the average width
in each of them is made on a significant portion of ridges.
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Fig. 5. Accuracy of the nearest neighbour classifier using the leave-one-out method as function 
of the mask radius from 50 to 250 pixels, and the number of sectors (4, 8, 16 32). 
 
Two observations can be drawn: 
• the mask size must be large enough to cover approximately all image but 
disregarding the noisiest portions of it (e.g. the ones near to the background, 
which are subjected to elastic distortion more than inner ones); 
• the number of sectors must be such that the estimation of the average width in 
each of them is made on a significant portion of ridges. 
 
Table 1 shows the best accuracy obtained with the proposed method, the analogue 
global measure we adopted in [3] and the set of state-of-the-art features also used in 
that paper [7, 8, 10].  
In order to consider the best-case selection of parameters for the proposed measure, 
we have considered a mask with a radius of 200 pixels and 32 sectors (for the 
classification we have excluded the inner eight sectors). The other features from the 
previous work do not need a parameter selection. 
The second column of Table 1 is related to the percentage of patterns correctly 
classified, the third one to the percentage of fake fingerprints correctly detected (fake 
detection rate), and the fourth one to the percentage of live fingerprints wrongly 
classified as fake ones (live misdetection rate). It is worth noting that our approach 
allows a performance much better than that of the ridge width computed on the whole 
image, and of some state-of-the-art features. Moreover, it exhibits a very good trade-
off between fake detection rate and live misdetection rate. In other words, the rate of 
clients (genuine users) “stopped” by a false positive message in real operative 
environments should be significantly lower than that exhibited by other features. The 
only feature having a lower live misdetection rate, that is, the perspiration-based 
feature proposed in [10], exhibits a very low fake detection rate (Table 1, sixth row). 
In other words, it has a negligible impact on fraudulent access trials by fake 
fingerprints.  
Figure 6.6: Accuracy of the nearest neighbour classifier using the leave-one-out
method as function of the mask radius from 50 to 250 pixels, and the number of
secto s (4, 8, 16 32).
6.5.2 In the frequency domain
Figur 6.7 shows the range of values of HFE measures, computed on the whole
data set, for live and fake fingerprint images. The average, the minimum and the
maximum values are reported for each value ofR (the radius of the region), which
ranges between 0 and int[min(W,H)/2], whereW and H are the image sizes. It
is easy to see that theHFE range is such that the se aration b tween fake and live
fingerprint classes increases with high values of R. This can be explained by the
fact that the ”residual” details coming from the high frequencies are progressively
filt red in the fake images, thus th ir power sp ctrum is signific ntly lower than
that of live images.
Accordingly, we used the so-called Fisher distance (FD), which is a paramet-
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Figure 3. Range of values taken by HFE measures computed by varying the integration radius. 
 
 
Accordingly, we used the so-called Fisher distance (FD), which is a parametrical class separation statistic, 
for selecting the appropriate Radius value: 
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In eq. (2),  µF, !F and µL, !L are the mean and the standard deviation of HFE measure for the fake and live 
patterns of the data set, respectively.  We selected the value of R which maximises the above Fisher distance. 
Then, we adopted the threshold-based classification approach [2, 5]: if the HFE measure is more than a 
pre-defined threshold, the image is classified as a live fingerprint, otherwise it is classified as a fake 
fingerprint. In fact, the amount of residual energy for live fingerprints is higher than that of fake fingerprints 
(Figure 2). 
In order to assess the classification performance of the HFE measure, we applied the following 
experimental protocol: 
Subdivide the whole data set D in three partitions DT, DV, DX. 
Estimate with DT  the R value for which the correspondent Fisher Distance is maximum. 
Compute with DV the threshold t for which the rate of images wrongly classified as “fake” fingerprints, is 
equal to the rate of images wrongly classified as “live” fingerprints. This error value is commonly called 
Equal Error Rate (EER). This threshold is computed by using the HFE measure computed as a function of R. 
Evaluate the classification error rate with DX by computing the HFE as a function of R and using the 
above threshold t. The error rate has been evaluated in terms of live fingerprints wrongly classified as fake 
ones (false reject rate, FRR) and fake fingerprints wrongly classified as alive ones (false accept rate, FAR). 
In a practical use of this measure, DT and DV are data sets available to the designer, which computes the 
radius value maximising the Fisher distance with DT, and estimates the classification threshold for an 
expected error rate with DV (e.g. the EER threshold). Once the radius and the threshold have been set,  the 
fingerprint vitality detector is online and can classify unknown images submitted in a real operative 
environment (in our experiments this is “represented” by images in DX). 
Figure 6.7: Range of values taken by HFE measures computed by varying the
integration radius.
rical class separation statistic, for selecting the appropriate Radius value:
FD =
(µL − µF )2
σ2L + σ
2
F
(6.3)
In eq. 6.3, µF , σF and µL, σL are the mean and the standard deviation ofHFE
measure for the fake and live patterns of the data set, respectively. We selected
the value of R which maximises he above Fisher distance. Then, we adopted the
threshold-based classification approach [56], [59]: if the HFE measure is more
than a pre-defined threshold, the image is classified as a live fingerprint, otherwise
it is classified as a fake fingerprint. In fact, the amount of residual energy for live
fingerprints is higher than that of fake fingerprints (Figure 6.5). In order to assess
the classification performance of theHFE measure, we applied the following ex-
perimental protocol: Subdivide the whole data set D in three partitions DT , DV ,
DX . Estimate withDT theR value for which the correspondent Fisher Distance is
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maximum. Compute withDV the threshold t for which the rate of images wrongly
classified as ”fake” fingerprints, is equal to the rate of images wrongly classified as
”live” fingerprints. This error value is commonly called Equal Error Rate (EER).
This threshold is computed by using the HFE measure computed as a function
of R. Evaluate the classification error rate with DX by computing the HFE as a
function ofR and using the above threshold t. The error rate has been evaluated in
terms of live fingerprints wrongly classified as fake ones (false reject rate, FRR)
and fake fingerprints wrongly classified as alive ones (false accept rate, FAR). In
a practical use of this measure,DT andDV are data sets available to the designer,
which computes the radius value maximising the Fisher distance with DT , and
estimates the classification threshold for an expected error rate with DV (e.g. the
EER threshold). Once the radius and the threshold have been set, the fingerprint
vitality detector is online and can classify unknown images submitted in a real op-
erative environment (in our experiments this is ”represented” by images in DX).
We repeated the above performance assessment for 500 random permutations of
the data in D in order to get different partitions, and reported the average and the
standard deviation for these runs in Table 6.1. In all runs the sizes ofDT ,DV ,DX
were 640, 320, 480 samples, respectively. The priors of fake and live classes were
equal. It is easy to see from Table 6.1 that the radius values are very stable around
their average. Accordingly, estimating the radius by using the class-separation
metric on a training set, namely, the Fisher distance, is effective. Error rate results
further show the effectiveness of the proposed measure. In particular, the stan-
dard deviation of the expected EER is very near to its mean. The correspondent
FAR and FRR follow the prediction on DV , also by exhibiting a low standard
deviation.
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Average Standard deviation
Radius (freq. units) 133 4
EER (%) 2.4 0.9
FAR (%) 2.0 0.9
FRR (%) 3.3 2.1
Table 6.1: Average and standard deviation values of the Radius onD, the expected
EER onD, the related error rate onDX , for the 500 runs of our experiment. error
rate on DX , for the 500 runs of our experiment.
6.6 Performance comparison
In order to assess the performance of the proposed morphologic features we pro-
pose a comparison of the live-fake classification accuracy of these with the fea-
tures of the state-of the-art. All the proposed results are based on the dataset
described at Section 6.4.
Table 6.2 shows the best accuracy obtained with the proposed methods, the ana-
logue global measure we adopted in [58] and the set of state-of-the-art features
also used in that paper [53], [54], [56]. We have tuned the parameters of the new
features in order to consider the best-case selection: concerning with the ridge
width liveness detection method, we have considered a mask with a radius of
200 pixels and 32 sectors (for the classification we have excluded the inner eight
sectors). Instead, for the computation of power spectrum we have fixed the inte-
gration area with a frequency radius of 100 frequency units. The other features
from the previous works do not need a parameter selection. The second column of
Table 6.2 is related to the percentage of patterns correctly classified, the third one
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to the percentage of fake fingerprints correctly detected (fake detection rate), and
the fourth one to the percentage of live fingerprints wrongly classified as fake ones
(live misdetection rate). An evident observation it that both the new approaches
allow a performance much better than that of the state-of-the-art features. More-
over, these exhibit a good trade-off between fake detection rate and live misdetec-
tion rate. In other words, the rate of clients (genuine users) ”stopped” by a false
positive message in real operative environments should be significantly lower than
that exhibited by other features. The only feature having a lower live misdetection
rate, that is, the perspiration-based feature proposed in [56], exhibits a very low
fake detection rate (Table 6.2, sixth row). In other words, it has a negligible im-
pact on fraudulent access trials by fake fingerprints. Eighth row of Table 6.2 also
points out that our features exhibit a performance superior than that of all investi-
gated state-of-the-art features. The overall performance difference is greater than
3.0%. Even in this case, the live misdetection rate of the proposed method is the
lowest one.
The last two rows are related to the fusion of new features. Applying a classi-
fication directly in the feature space allows to obtain the best accuracy. This result
is allowed by the complementarity of the two morphologic features. The fusion
of the new measures by an arithmetic average gives a less significant performance
than the previous combination procedure but greater if compared with the other
methods. On the basis of reported results, we believe the our work can be consid-
ered an effective contribution for detecting the vitality of fingerprint images.
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Feature Overall
Accuracy
Fake
detect.
rate
Live mis-
detect.
rate
Ridge Width 81.3 81.1 18.4
Power Spectrum 84.4 85.1 16.4
Ridge width (SF3 in [58]) 68.7 69.2 31.7
DM3 [53], [56]; DF1 [58] 62.2 63.1 38.7
DM5 [10]; DF2 [58] 49.4 50.8 52.0
DM6 [10]; DF3 [58] 51.4 8.9 3.6
Bending energy [54]; SF2 in [58] 48.5 49.9 52.7
Fusion (Old feature space) 78.7 79.0 21.6
Fusion (New feature space) 92.9 93.6 7.9
Fusion (Arithmetic Average new
features)
90.3 90.8 10.2
Table 6.2: Percentage accuracy of the proposed measures compared with that of
the state-of-the-art features [53], [54], [56]. The column ”fake detection rate” is
related to the rate of fake fingerprints correctly detected, whilst the column ”live
misdetection rate” is related to the rate of live fingerprints wrongly classified as
fake ones.
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A biometric system is a recent technology that permits the automatic recognition
of an individual by some of his physics or behavioural marks. The development
and diffusion of such systems has driven a particular attention toward high perfor-
mance and security. Concerning on this last design bond, a considerable number
of recent works have focused the attention on the wide spread of threats that can
compromise a biometric system. After a brief introduction on the born of such
technology, we have given a detailed description and classification of all the weak
points of an automatic process of identification. In particular, the entire work of
this thesis has dwelled upon one of these threats: fake biometric. A spoof at-
tack involves the use of a fake biometric (fingerprint, for our work) to imitate a
legitimate submission. From the first studies in 2002 ( the well publicized study
of Matsumoto ) to the current researches, academic and industrial groups have
tested the vulnerability of commercial fingerprint scanner showing how it is pos-
sible the reproduction of a fingerprint and the use of this for a ”spoofing” attack.
If on one hand, the first works have shown the feasibility of submitting a fake
fingerprint, currently the attention is focused on developing solution against such
threats. ”Liveness detection” is the expression with which is indicated the re-
search of a vitality sign in the submitted biometric, in order to avoid and obstruct
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deceitful attempts. Although the research in this field is quite recent, a lot of so-
lutions have been proposed: from hardware ones, based on the integration in the
biometric system of an additional device devoted to liveness detection, to software
solutions that manage the task by algorithms for digital image. In both cases, the
variety of solutions is not supported by testing procedures. All the features are
analyzed on limited dataset of images that does not guarantee statistical validity.
Our work is oriented toward two main direction: firstly, we have organized the
state of the art in a clear taxonomy, classifying all the solutions by means of
their typology (elastic deformation, morphologic features...) and by their measure
protocol (dynamic, static...). Secondly, we have implemented liveness detection
methods proposed in literature and proposed new ones: after having reproduced
all the main measures of the state-of-the-art we have applied these on a statistical
valid dataset. We have,so, analyzed the classification accuracy of such measures
and their fusion on this new set of images. From this study we have found that, in
order to obtain high performance, it is suggested to employ the fusion of differ-
ent typologies of measures, exploiting their orthogonality. Higher classification
accuracy is obtained with two novel morphologic features presented in the last
chapter. The first based on the measure of the ridge width alteration, the sec-
ond on the high frequency contribution in the Fourier space. Our work gives an
important contribution in the liveness detection method because, after defining a
clear state-of-the-art, proposes new valid solutions in this field. Although the high
efforts for obtaining more and more efficient liveness detection measures, the re-
search is still in an early state. The novelty of the question has had the upper hand
on the strictness of the experimental results. Currently, the integration of liveness
detection methods in a real biometric systems remains one fundamental task for
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future works: that is how it is possible the combination of a verification systems
with the liveness detection modulus and how the performance of such systems can
be altered with the increase of security levels.
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